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HEGEL'S DOCTRINE OF THE WILL

BY

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PREFACE

IN the following brief essay I have endeavoured to give an outline of Hegel's doctrine of the will. Human life for Hegel is one, and the will is simply the man. Life's highest ideal is not achieved by the one who "cares but to pass into the silent life," but by such as live well the every-day life of the world; who see treasured up in the various relations of concrete social life—the family, the state, the church—the spiritual experience of the human race.

I wish to inscribe this essay to my father and mother.

JOHN ANGUS MAC VANNEL.

Columbia University, May, 1896.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

§ 1. The intellectual and spiritual vitality of every age, as well as of every individual, is due to the dominating and fructifying influence of some one comprehensive idea. The present age owes the greater portion of its mental life to the principle of evolution; an idea which has become the very atmosphere of all enquiry in the domain of art, of science and of religion. In the popular consciousness it is accepted without dissent that the principle first appeared in its application by Darwin to the facts of biology, and that its extension to the sphere of mental life was an after-thought. As a matter of fact, however, the systematic and more pregnant application of the principle in the domain of history, of art, of philosophy, and of religion had been made by Hegel almost half a century before the time of Darwin; and even Hegel cannot lay claim to its discovery. Evolution and Darwinism are far from being convertible terms. As is true of all great ideas, evolution has been in the world from the first beginnings of thought. Traces of it are to be found in early Greek philosophy and in many of the heathen mythologies. The conception in its present fulness has been slowly evolved in the environment of the advancing human knowledge of twenty-four centuries. It is no longer a theory merely; it has become a creed: and it now lends such a living interest to the past development of all organisms, institutions, and creeds, that it is a difficult matter to adequately appreciate the standpoint of those who were without

the idea. No longer can the saying of Goethe be accepted without reservation that "the history of the past is a book with seven seals."

It is this conception of development that has caused the history of philosophy to be regarded as a part of philosophy itself. A more sympathetic appreciation is gradually coming to see in the different systems which history presents, the progressive effort on the part of the human spirit to reach a more adequate conception of the world as rational. An earnest study of these systems but strengthens our faith in the spiritual nature and ultimate destiny of man. "The refutation of a system," says Hegel, "only means that its limits are passed, and that the fixed principle in it has been reduced to an organic element in the completer system that follows. Thus, the history of philosophy in its true meaning deals not with the past, but with the eternal and veritable present; and in its results resembles not a museum of the aberrations of the human intellect, but a pantheon of God-like figures representing various stages of the immanent logic of all human thought."¹

§ 2. In philosophy as in religion there has been the spiritual ebb and flow; but with each return of the tide there has been advance. "Biologically considered," says Prof. James, "man's life consists for the most part in adjustments that are unscientific, and deals with probabilities and not with certainties." In the development of philosophy the case is very similar. Many who have essayed a system of philosophy never reached the high level of thought necessary to express adequately the essential, informing spirit of their time. For the fullest expression of the spiritual life of England—in that she was forced to find her metaphysics somewhere—we must go not to her philosophy but to her

¹ *Werke*, VI, § 86, Quoted by Sterrett, *Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*, p. 15.

poetry. Twice only in the history of Western thought has philosophy reached the high-tide: first, in the embodiment by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle of the essential truth in the rich and complex life of the period in which they lived; and second, the modern development in Germany which sprang up within the bosom of Christian education, begun by Kant, and which was carried to its completion, and therein its most adequate expression, by Hegel. The outcome of both developments gives us a deeper faith in the essential rationality of the actual world, and more clearly emphasizes the primacy of thought. "What is the absolute nature of man's conscious experience, intellectual and moral?" is the question for which both sought an explanation—as it is the question of all philosophy. Both maintain that the only principle of explanation is that of self-consciousness. In other words, that the absolute nature of all reality is spiritual. The second, however, did more than merely reaffirm the truth maintained by the first. It furnished a new and fuller demonstration, rendered possible by reason of an enriched experience—of those threshings which the soul of man was forced to undergo through centuries of struggle in its advance to higher issues.

§ 3. Prof. Huxley claimed for Descartes' system the distinction of being the final philosophy; and others have claimed the same for the systems of Spinoza, Leibnitz and Hegel. As Prof. James says, we need to be ever reminded afresh that no philosophy can ever be more than an hypothesis. It is a slavish submission to the letter of any doctrine or system that kills. Life is widening; it is becoming a fuller and a richer thing, and human experience will ever prove too strong for any system. Nor was Hegel one who would expect, much less who would crave our indulgence. Doubtless, as Prof. Green once said of the system, "it will all have to be done over again." Nevertheless, so compre-

hensive a system as that of Hegel, however we regard it as an achievement, was at least splendid as an endeavor; and the due meed of which is our grateful admiration. Conditioned as it was by the thought of the preceding twenty-four centuries, it is fair to regard the system as the summing up and most perfect expression of the German development of philosophy.

The system has been designated "pantheistic" times without number. The truth or untruth of such a charge can be ascertained only by a sympathetic and earnest study of the system at first hand. There is one charge in particular, however, of which Hegel has been and still continues to be accused. It is the prevailing belief that he is simply an *a priori* metaphysician, who spins theories out of his head altogether regardless of the facts of experience. In his introduction to the *Logik*, Hegel states the connection which his philosophy bears, and of necessity bears, to experience. "It does not in the least neglect the empirical facts contained in the several sciences, but recognizes and adopts them; it appreciates and applies towards its own structure the universal element in these sciences, their laws and classifications; but besides all this, into the categories of science it introduces, and gives currency to other categories."² Again: "Thought is only true in proportion as it sinks itself in the facts."³ It is not too much to say that neither in his premises nor in his conclusions does Hegel go beyond experience. In the history of philosophy it would be difficult to find a more practical and sober-minded philosopher than Hegel; and it is this that gives to his system its greatest recommendation. For idealism as it is ordinarily understood Hegel could have no sympathy whatever. He was an idealist; but not in the sense of reducing the world to the mere ideas of an individ-

² *Werke* VI. § 9. Translated by William Wallace, 2nd ed. Oxford, 1892.

³ *Ibid.*, § 23.

ual. Philosophy must include every phase of the actual world. Reality is one, and Reason knows itself as the essence of Reality. "The rational is the real, and the real is the rational." This is the contention of Hegel. But by no effort of pure thought or reasoning *in vacuo* does he attempt to discern the rational. The task of philosophy, as Hegel conceived it, is to trace in nature, in the human mind, in social institutions, in history, and in religion, an immanent Reason. "In thine own soul build it up again," sings the Chorus in Faust. Hegel starts from the assumption—the assumption, it may be said, of all the sciences—that existence is one, and intelligence is one, and that the "unprejudiced and whole-hearted" mind of man can know reality. And it can do this simply because, as a spiritual being, man "is more than individual, because the universal nature that is in him can break through the isolation of a merely individual existence, and go forth to find itself—the objective reflex of its own being—in that universal thought and reason which moves and lives in nature, in the infinitely diversified interests of human life, and in the progressive history of the race."⁴

The whole aim of the Logic, as Prof. Watson has well said, "is to show that thought is competent to grasp 'being' in its inmost nature, and that we have only to state explicitly what thought actually thinks, to be convinced beyond the possibility of doubt, that we actually think 'being' as it is, and not any distorted appearance of it. No thinker has ever insisted with the same earnestness of conviction as

⁴Principal Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 300. So Hegel: "There cannot be a Divine Reason and a human, there cannot be a Divine Spirit and a human, which are *absolutely different*. Human reason—the consciousness of one's being—is indeed reason; it is the divine in man, and Spirit, in so far as it is the Spirit of God, is not a spirit beyond the stars. On the contrary, God is present, omnipresent, and exists as Spirit in all spirits." *Philosophy of Religion* (Eng. Trans. Speirs and Sanderson, p. 33).

Hegel that the world we know is the only real world. This conviction is bound up with his whole conception of reality; for he believed and regarded it as the special task of philosophy to demonstrate, that in the world as it actually is—the world of nature and the distinctively human world of society, art and religion—reason is at work, and hence that the task of philosophy is to show that ‘what is real is rational,’ the spiritual world is the natural world contemplated as it really is.”⁵

§ 4. It was Parmenides who first among the Greeks asserted the identity of thought and being. For Aristotle, the universe has its principle or life in God, who is immanent in and yet transcends all things. In Aristotle’s own words, God, *νόησις ἡ καθ’ αὐτὴν*, or *ἐνέργεια ἡ καθ’ αὐτὴν*, i. e., He is self-conscious Reason. Such is also the “Idea” of Hegel. Herbert Spencer, in one of the concluding sections of his *Sociology* makes a noteworthy and often-quoted remark: “Consequently,” he says, “the final outcome of that speculation commenced by the primitive man is that the Power manifested throughout the universe distinguished as material, is the same Power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness.”⁶ Aristotle and Hegel could both assent to this; but they would go further. It was their endeavour to show that what we regard as the corporeal world is the manifestation of the same reality whose nature is most adequately revealed in the mental world—in self-consciousness;—in other words, that nature and spirit are stages in the evolution of one life which remains identical with itself through all its changes. There is for Hegel an immanent and universal reason through all the life of the external world and in the intellectual and moral life of man. Thus to the notion of the Absolute Hegel gave a new significance. For

⁵ *Philosophical Review*, vol. iii., art. “The Problem of Hegel.” p. 548.

⁶ § 659.

him the Absolute is not a shadowy something on the borderland of dreams, but the indwelling and informing life of the rich and varied contents of the universe—the beginning and end of all. "All that God is," he says, "He imparts and reveals; and He does so, at first, in and through nature." Thus the material world rightly understood is the natural environment for the life of spirit, where—

"That which drew from out the boundless deep
Turns again home."

§ 5. To this idealistic conception of the universe, Hegel joined the doctrine of evolution to which reference was made at the beginning of this essay as the informing principle in the mental life of the present century. This idea of development is the leading conception of Hegel's philosophy. He was the first to clearly perceive that the most important application of the law is to be found in the development of man's spiritual nature. Tennyson makes Ulysses say, "I am a part of all that I have met." Man is really a part of all that has gone before. More than of any other creature, it may be said of him that only in the light of his history can we adequately appreciate what he has become. Conscious mind, while it is the most independent of finite existences, is at the same time the most dependent. But Hegel would be in earnest with the idea of evolution. For him as for Aristotle the full nature of any reality is revealed only in the totality of its development, and only when its end is before us can Reality be completely characterized. "We can only understand the amœba and the polype by a light reflected from the study of man."⁸ Yet a very great part of current evolutionism exhausts itself in merely tabulating the phenomenal phases of reality, with no attempt at

⁷ *Werke* VI. § 140 (The Logic of Hegel, Wallace's Translation.)

⁸ Lewes, *Study of Psychology*, p. 122.

showing the vital, essential principle in the development—and thereby losing the worth of evolution as a principle for the explanation of reality. Hegel would not deny the validity of the historical sciences. "Yet how," he would ask, "can we say there has been evolution and not mere aimless change?" Only in the light of a realized idea can we say that there has been such a thing as evolution. To show this is in reality the task of philosophy—to gather the partial and seemingly contingent elements and arrange them according to their realized idea. The principle of explanation must not be that of the higher by the lower, but one which, while explaining the lower, is also adequate for the explanation of the higher. Matter, according to Hegel, far from explaining spirit, can itself only be explained in terms of spirit. In all paths of human progress the question is, "What has been evolved?" The higher forms of religion cannot be explained by merely tracing their development through refinements on the crude superstitions of savages. Nor is it an adequate explanation of society to find its basis in sympathy among creatures of a like kind. "The process of cosmical evolution," says Laurie, "which is supposed ultimately to have culminated in man (and a process there must have been) does not affect the interpretation of man as a distinctive organism. Granting Darwinian presumptions, there is yet a *point at which* the immanent universal Will emerges out of self-consciousness and constitutes Man. It is from this point of view that we start in our endeavors to say what man is."⁹ And what is in man now must have been in him potentially from the first. This is Hegel's conception.

§ 6. The test of any system of philosophy, it has been said, is the account it gives of the institutions of civilization. "What does it see in human history and the institutions of

⁹ *The Ethics of Reason*, p. 189.

the family, civil society, the state, the church?"¹⁰ Uniting as he did the idea of development with his idealism, it will be at once apparent what is Hegel's conception of the institutional life of the human race. In all existing institutions the past lives on in the present, and forms its central life and nucleus. In those which have withstood the test of time, the family, the state, the church, unless we are to resign ourselves to a thorough-going skepticism about humanity, we must be prepared to admit with Hegel that to some degree at least the "real is the rational." Not that "whatever is is right;" but in so far as institutions have served as embodiments of man's needs and aspirations they are of ethical value. Institutions are the expression of man's conception of his relation to his environment; the realized idea of humanity. The social organism is the incarnation of man's inner life: virtues are the subjective habits of his will, and institutions are their outward embodiment: in other words, experience shows they are the conditions under which man can best realize himself. Thus, according to Hegel's conception, they grew out of an ethical need—the self-realization of man. Not that in their development this end of the fulfillment of the capacities of the human spirit was always consciously presented, yet in the consciousness of man there must have supervened a universal principle, which, however dimly, enabled him to set himself up as an end to be realized, and to present to his consciousness persons other than himself. It is this universal principle of reason which, in the development of the human race, has been the immanent and informing life of all individual and social activity.

§ 7. The ethical process is then for Hegel that for which the cosmical process exists. The conscious soul is at first apparently immersed in nature; its *notion* is that of a free spiritual being. The consciousness of self implies a con-

¹⁰ Harris, *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 17.

sciousness of not-self, and grows with it and by means of it. Its progress is thus one of self-determination and self-realization through environment—the environment of an intellectual and moral world. "We think in relations," says Herbert Spencer. The ethical world is a world of relations also. Nature and society as systems of relations are organic to the individual as intelligence and will through the emergence in him of the universal Reason. It is in this environment of intelligence and of social institutions that man is to find fulfilment for his will and assert his freedom. Thus man, by identifying himself with the established laws, virtues and institutions—although he may not at first be aware of the import of his action—is identifying his good with the common good; and his rights and his duties arise in proportion as he becomes identified with the social system. In other words, he becomes a Person. The child is first a member of the family and its moralization proceeds through the desires and inclinations being brought into conformity with the duties and ideals prescribed in the family life. "New occasions teach new duties." More comprehensive institutions, the school, civil society, the state, the church, render possible new ideals through new relations and furnish further opportunities for the expansion of the individual. The individual will—his essential self—expands in the life of the people, and gradually comes to discover that established laws and institutions, far from being restrictions on his liberty, are the very substance in which man becomes human, and spiritual, and free.

§ 8. The aim of the present essay is to give an outline of Hegel's doctrine of the will as realized in social institutions. For Hegel the will is the man; it has no other meaning. And man is moral only as he devotes himself to the common good. For Hegel, as for T. H. Green, "There is no other genuine enthusiasm for humanity than one which has trav-

eled the common highway of reason--the life of the good neighbor and honest citizen--and can never forget that it is still only a further stage of the same journey." Since Hegel's system is an organic whole and thus scarcely admits of dismembering, there are many topics connected with the subject of which only mention or the merest outline can be given within the limits to which this short essay must be confined.

A true philosophy must "see life steadily, and see it whole"—it must be one, in other words, whose principle is extensive as well as intensive enough to embrace in its development every phase of existence. That truth lies in the whole is the very spirit of Hegelianism. The system gives one at least a feeling for the complexity of existence and a distrust of the extreme. Yet it would be an uninteresting system indeed that did not contain inconsistencies. Consistency ever tends to become dogmatic, and hence unfruitful in its results. In the very spirit of his philosophy Hegel at his death might have said: "I pass, but shall not die." Browning makes David say to the dying Saul: "Each deed thou hast done dies, revives, goes to work in the world." The present generation is little conscious of how much of its mental supplies is drawn from the system of Hegel.

One cannot express just what in his mental and spiritual life he owes to the teacher he has once learned to reverence. But it is difficult to understand how, after a sympathetic study of Hegel's system, one could refuse his assent to the fair and excellent words of Prof. Watson: "Contact with a mind so wide, so subtle and so deep, a mind fired with sympathy for all the manifestations of the human spirit, cannot be otherwise than stimulating and ennobling."

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF HEGEL

§ 9. The preceding chapter may serve to indicate the general standpoint from which this essay on Hegel's doctrine of the will in its application to the institutional life of the race has been undertaken. The system of Hegel, like thought itself, is essentially an organism, and only when viewed as such can we hope to understand and appreciate the various phases or members of the whole. This will involve a brief survey of the rise and development of the main problems for which each generation sought a solution, and which Hegel had to face anew, and of the system in which his own solution is embedded. Hegel found before him the claims of nature on the one hand, and those of spirit on the other; of the finite and of the infinite; of the individual and of society; of the necessity of nature on the one hand, and of moral responsibility on the other. It may with fairness be said that Hegel was the first to clearly perceive that the claims were complementary rather than antagonistic. It is in this that his essential originality exists. Stirling speaks of him as a "crafty borrower." The same charge has been brought against Aristotle. But in borrowing (which of necessity is an element in all progress, especially intellectual and spiritual progress) Aristotle and Hegel comprehended the vitalizing truth in the systems of their predecessors, and embodied it in higher forms. It is in this that true originality consists.

To fully indicate the method by which Hegel attempts the

reconciliation of the opposing doctrines which have already been referred to would mean an exposition of the entire system. Prudence itself would dictate that no such task be attempted. The object of the essay will have been attained if it serve to indicate (1) the problem of Hegel, and this in its ethical bearings chiefly; and (2) how the individual subject, born into the world with the possibility of distinguishing itself from the objects it knows and the ends it chooses, gradually erects itself into a person, intelligent, social, ethical, by consciously identifying himself with the ethical substance into which he is born, and how in turn "the microcosm of the individual mind reflects and reproduces in shorthand the whole of that process which has taken place on the grander scale of the world's spiritual history."¹

"It is true philosophy," says Kant, "to trace the diverse forms of a thing through all its history."² In this historical outline of the problem of philosophy as it presented itself to Hegel, the attempt will be made merely to disengage the leading principles of the development, dwelling, perhaps, more particularly on the systems of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, yet only in so far as the elements of truth in their systems are transmuted by the alchemy of Hegel's genius and given a fuller and more harmonious embodiment. Nor in this introduction does it occur to us to say anything new, but it may be that through insight into the defects and inconsistencies of preceding systems we may the more adequately appreciate the nature of Hegel's problem, and also some of the defects in its solution. The problems of ethics and of society are not new; and, while the difficulty lies in their solution, yet it might be that a clearer statement of the real problem would carry us a considerable way to its solution.

§ 10. To determine the true relation between the three

¹ Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 298.

² *Physische Geographie*, Introduction, p. iv. § 4.

points of rational convergence, Man, Nature, God, has been the subject of reflective thought in all ages. From this results the difficulty which Martineau has called "the dualism of the intellect dealing with a triad of intelligibles." To the Greeks, inasmuch as inner experience is always subsequent to the perception of the external world, the relations of God and the cosmos appealed with the greater force. Mediaeval philosophy, as a result of Christianity, was engaged almost entirely with the relation of man and God, to the subordination of the claims of nature. In the spirit of revolt, the claims of nature to our highest regard have, in modern thought, been perhaps unduly emphasized.

"What is the substance or unitary reality underlying all the diversity of the world around us?" was the question of early Greek philosophy. The Ionic races solved existence in the sure and certain terms of physical atheism; the Doric in terms of intellectual pantheism. Plato endeavored to mediate between them. He revered Parmenides, as he tells us, more than all other philosophers together: for he had determined the future of metaphysics, in that he first made thinking intelligence the truth of things. For Plato, reality, as such, is spiritual. In his system mind is first separated from body. Strictly speaking, however, it is not correct to regard his system as a metaphysical dualism. Aristotle's ontology in its logical outcome is a dualism that inclines to idealism. The relation between the body and the soul presents us with the most significant example of the dual nature of all things. Mind is the principle which vitalizes and informs matter: life and mentality were for Aristotle identical terms. "Existence is the activity of the Divine Reason." When he comes to the theology, however—the final completion of his philosophy—the ideal element is given pre-eminence as the only self-existent reality. God is no longer the perfect Actuality of which the world is the potentiality

(δυνάμις), but an Actuality absolutely ἀπὸ δυνάμεως—a mere First Cause, not a *Causa Immanens*, and here we are but a step from the religion of annihilation. Greek philosophy culminated in a psychological and ethical dualism—a dualism of body and mind, reason and sensibility—the despair of a philosophy of the concrete life of man.

§ 11. In the middle ages, in spite of the fundamental doctrine of Christianity—the essential unity of apparent disparates—this withdrawal from nature became still more pronounced. For them, it is true, the Real was the Universal, but a universal won through abstraction. The rebound to the opposite extreme was inevitable. The watchword of the revolt was “the Real is the individual:” whatever is true must be in the actual world, and present to sensation. To maintain or dispute the truth of this proposition has been the task of modern philosophy.

§ 12. The system of Descartes, with whom modern philosophy is usually said to begin, forms a ganglion, as it were, between the old and the new. His system is important for the reason that all the problems of modern inquiry were either explicitly stated, or immanent in it. For Descartes, *corpus est res extensa; mens est res cogitans*. The dualism of mind and matter is absolute. Mind and matter, spiritual and corporeal substance have parallel and original rights. Thus, Descartes puts us face to face with the real difficulty of philosophy. If the system represents the final type of philosophy, a distinction which Prof. Huxley claimed for it, then philosophy may at once be given up as a delusion. There are three criticisms that may fairly be made against Descartes' system. (1) If, as Descartes asserts, mind and matter are things-in-themselves, absolutely separated from each other, they can have no conceivable nature. In order that a thinking substance exist, it must have a perception or thought of some object. The “thinking substance” of

Descartes is like Aristotle's First Cause, which dwells at an ever-receding end from its object—"thinking upon thought." If we are to be consistent, we must admit that such a First Cause and such a thinking substance are both unknown and unknowable. (2) In the exigency of explanation Descartes assumes that there is an apprehension by the mind of what is external to it. Such an assumption is also inadmissible. Either the premises or the assumption must be given up. If mind is simple, abstract self-consciousness, with no object but itself, and matter the extended, passive substance Descartes assumes it to be, there can be no knowledge one of the other. Mind and matter are in some way elements of a unity: and when severed their nature becomes inconceivable. (3) In the Cartesian system the relation which God occupies is a merely external one—a *tertium quid*—to mind and matter; producing, uniting and sustaining them, not by any intelligible evolution of His nature, but going beyond Himself to create existences beside Himself by a miracle altogether external and arbitrary. It is a substitution of assertion for reason. Descartes' conception is that our idea of God is not God in us, but an idea of which God's existence is the cause. Since, then, in God, who is the Absolute Unity, idea and reality fall asunder (He is conceived simply as the Cause of our idea of Him), God is made a purely objective and finite existence.

The work of Malebranche and Spinoza was but the legitimate evolution into clearer consciousness of the principles immanent in the system of Descartes. Malebranche turned to supernaturalism and transfigured the universe into God; Spinoza to naturalism and translated God into the universe. For Spinoza mind and matter are only accidents of the one substance; they are really the same thing looked at from different points of view.³ Interaction is out of the question.

³ Prof. Lloyd Morgan, in his *Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, p. 3,

The two kinds of processes exist alongside of each other, not through each other. *Deus sive natura.*

"In one point of view," says Prof. Edward Caird, "this theory of Spinoza deserves the highest praise for that very characteristic which probably excited most odium against it at the time it was first published, namely, its exaltation of matter. It is the mark of an imperfect Spiritualism to hide its eyes from outward nature, and to shrink from the material as impure and defiling. But its horror and fear are proofs of weakness; it flies from an enemy it cannot overcome. Spinoza's bold identification of spirit and matter, God and nature, contains in it the germ of a higher idealism than can be found in any philosophy that asserts the claims of the former at the expense of the latter. A system that begins by making nature godless, will inevitably end, as Schelling once said, in making God unnatural. The expedients by which Descartes keeps matter at a distance from God were intended to maintain His pure Spirituality; but their ultimate effect is seen in his reduction of the spiritual nature to mere will. As Christianity has its superiority over other religions in this, that it does not end with the opposition of the human to the divine, the natural to the spiritual, but ultimately reconciles them, so a true idealism must vindicate its claims by absorbing materialism into itself. It was, therefore, a true instinct of philosophy that led Spinoza to raise matter to the co-equal of spirit, and at the same time to pro-

says "that the reality of object and subject is strictly co-ordinate. And those who hold this view regard as little better than nonsense the assertion that whereas the reality of the subject is unquestionable, the reality of the object is a matter that is open to discussion. Self and cosmos are of co-ordinate reality; they are the polarized aspects of experience as explained through reason." While subject and object are co-ordinate, yet the subject is *conscious* of the relation which exists. It is the recognition of this which constitutes the fundamental difference between the doctrine of Spinoza and Herbert Spencer on the one hand, and of Idealism on the other. Spencer remains true to the logical implications of his doctrine; Spinoza failed to do so.

test against the Cartesian conception of matter as mere inert mass, moved only by impulse from without. 'What were a God that only impelled a world from without?' says Gœthe. 'It becomes Him to stir it by an inward energy, to involve nature in Himself, Himself in nature, so that which lives and moves and has its being in Him can never feel the want of His power or His Spirit.'"⁴

Nevertheless Spinoza's transformation of the world *sub specie aeternitatis* was superficial. He left it almost as he found it. His Absolute Being is the dead All-absorbing substance, not the spirit that *reveals* itself in nature and in the mind of man. His parallelism is at times equivalent to the doctrine of Leibnitz of the essential identity of mind and matter. In passing, however, from abstract indeterminate being to the idea of God conceived as a self-determining principle, the source of all the manifold determinations of the universe, he broke with the very first principle of his system, but in so doing caught sight, as Caird says, of the idea of a unity pre-supposed in and transcending the difference between matter and mind, subject and object.

§ 13. Historically the parallelistic monism was turned in two directions—of materialism and of idealism. From Bacon, who "disclosed the way to unfettered waters and undreamed shores," had resulted a predilection to materialism, and the natural scientists were disposed to follow. Hobbes was their philosophical leader. In his system individualism was embodied in its severest form. He taught the natural origin of the state as Locke did that of knowledge. Man is merely a part of nature; all knowledge is experience; experience is merely sensuous perception. Hume's skepticism was the truth immanent in the systems of Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, and was the contribution of English thought to philosophy.

⁴*Essays in Literature and Philosophy*, Vol. I.

Leibnitz took the direction of idealism. "His system," Paulsen says, "is absolutely determined by his relation to Spinoza."⁵ Regarding existence as a whole as an ascending series of mental forces, he conceived of soul and body as but lower and higher forms of one being. The monads are beings of a spiritual nature. His disciple Wolff made soul and body two different things, and God he conceived as the external Governor of the universe, thus returning at a stroke to the Cartesian point of view; from monism to a lifeless dualism.

Thus from the doubt of Descartes and of Bacon comes the pure Intellect; which by Descartes is left to itself, while by Bacon it is given over to the leading and the light of nature. The followers in the line of the Cartesian tendency were, as has been seen, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Wolff; in that of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hume—the one led to materialism and skepticism, the other to an unsatisfying and imperfect spiritualism. The development in both directions had now reached its limit, and philosophy was hurried by David Hume, the prime inspirer of modern philosophy in its destructive and constructive sides, to a new and decisive turning point.

§ 14. Abstraction was the essential error of pre-Kantian philosophy; and even Kant, as will be noted in what follows, was never able to entirely free himself, much less his system, from the conditions of his time. Matter was set over against mind, the individual against society, the universal reign of law in the natural world against God, freedom and immortality. The fundamental enquiry of the great idealistic movement begun by Kant and carried to its completion by Hegel, was to find a principle sufficiently comprehensive to give impartial recognition to the claims of the scientific, ethical and religious consciousness of man. In other words, to show that

⁵ *Introduction to Philosophy* (translated by Thilly), p. 293.

man, natural, intelligent, moral, social and religious, is a being all of one piece, and that he came from and goes to God. Such was the problem of idealism, a revolution as rich in results for philosophy as that which Copernicus effected for astronomy. An outline of the development from Kant to Hegel remains to be given.

Far from denying the necessary connection of objects of experience in space and time (the contention of natural science), Kant rather set to work at the beginning to discover the universal principles which our ordinary and scientific knowledge presupposes. For only when these have been found can the more ambitious problem concerning the existence of supra-sensible realities, God and the freedom and immortality of the human soul, be with hope of success attempted. Starting provisionally from the ordinary dualism of thought and things, by a gradual transformation of the theory Kant arrived at the conclusion that the only way of accounting for this endless order of nature is that it is one which our own intelligence forges; that, instead of our passively apprehending objects (which Empiricists had maintained was the sole condition of our ordered experience), it is rather by our intelligence alone that known objects are constituted. Our "experience" must forever remain unexplained and unaccounted for so long as we maintain our belief that thought and nature are abstract opposites. The point of view, then, which Kant would have us take is this, that the science of being and the science of knowledge are organically one and inseparable. This was the fundamental principle in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Berkeley's idealism was built on sensations rather than on reason. The development from Kant to Hegel was the bringing to clearer consciousness the truth immanent in the systems of Plato and Aristotle.⁶

⁶ It may be interesting to quote the view of the late Prof. Romanes, made from

The outcome, then, of Kant's doctrine of space and time which is interwoven with his entire system of thought, considered in reference to itself alone, is that our conception of the nature of the Absolute Reality must be a spiritual one. For his doctrine, and the facts on which it is based, maintains the organic and living relation between subject and object. Both must be viewed as dependently sharing in a universal, spiritual life, in which each subsists and has its essential being. Space and time, therefore, we are to regard not as self-subsistent and pre-existent conditions of the Absolute—as previous philosophers had done when they conceived of the Absolute materialistically as "Substance:" rather we are to consider space and time as dependent functions of the Absolute. "Substance" is a purely relative notion and possesses only "phenomenal" validity. The Absolute is essentially spiritual.

Kant found in the "static and permanent ego" the presupposition of all connected experience. But it was a knowledge of phenomena only. He had shown that the mind was not the mere creature of environment—the *merely* passive, as Locke and Hume had conceived it. The great factor, it is true, was the active synthesis; but there was

the standpoint of science in his work, *Mind and Motion and Monism*, p. 36 f. (edited by Prof. Lloyd Morgan): "If the advance of natural science is now steadily leading us to the conclusion that there is no motion without mind, must we not see how the independent conclusion of mental science is thus independently confirmed—the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being without knowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come when we may begin, as it were, in a dawning light, to see that the study of nature and the study of mind are meeting upon this greatest of possible truths. And if this is the case—if there is no motion without mind, no being without knowing—shall we infer, with Clifford, that universal being is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that most stupendous of questions—Is there knowledge with the Most High? If there is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not rather infer that it is in the medium of mind and in the medium of knowledge we live, and move, and have our being?"

still needed the "prick of sense from the things-in-themselves." Kant was never able to bridge the chasm between phenomena and noumena in the world of knowledge, nor between desire and reason in the world of practice. The human spirit has two fundamental characteristics, the implications of which were not clearly grasped by Kant, though he himself had supplied the principle by which the apparent disparities might be reconciled. On the one hand, the human mind as such is conditioned in so far as it stands in an essential relation of dependence for its spiritual development on the world of nature, of society, and on God. On the other hand, the mind has within it a principle of rationality or spontaneity which enables it to react on its environment, and thus create its intellectual, its moral, and its religious world. Kant, it is true, made mind a factor in the constitution of experience; he also recoiled from Individualism in morals; yet he never reached the organic view of the relation of the environment to the individual which regards environment in all its phases, of nature, society, and religion, as well as the individual, as having their life in the organic evolution of one spiritual principle. "The age of Kant," says President Schurman, "was one of transition, and Kant's philosophy has not escaped the contradictions immanent to all Becoming."⁷ He was unable to perceive the full significance of the doctrine which is fundamental to his system. He could not free his system from the abstract dualism that destroys any system in which it occurs—the separation of thought and being. His insight led him to see that existence can only mean existence for a consciousness—but he could not hold himself fully to the idea that consciousness in the very act of being conscious transcends the dualism between itself and its object: that thus, freedom may include necessity, the noumenal the phenomenal, that

⁷ *Kantian Ethics and Ethics of Evolution*, p. 18.

spirit is the truth of nature. To show this was the work of Fichte and Schelling, but especially of Hegel.

In the preceding section it was maintained that Kant's peculiar merit (a merit to which previous philosophers could not legitimately lay claim) consisted in his constant endeavor to do full justice to the claims of the scientific, as well as to those of the moral and religious, consciousness. His investigation resulted in the discovery of the categories and of their supreme condition, the unity of apperception. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel worked out in their fulness the implications of this idealistic principle. The connection between mind and nature pointed to a common root of both—an organic unity with many antitheses; that the objective universe of nature and of history, in that it is intelligible, is the working of an immanent Reason to which man's consciousness is akin. Thus German Idealism was to raise the modern mind to a higher consciousness blending the "living realism of the ancient world and the inwardness and ideality of the Christian religion."

Starting from this principle of the unity of apperception, or the ego, Fichte, followed by Schelling, made it, as absolute, their metaphysical principle. For Fichte, as for Hegel, philosophy means the systematic development of thought from its most abstract phase to the wealth and fulness of real existence. His task, as he conceived it, was to bring into organic connection the *dissecta membra* of the Kantian system. His fundamental conception, as Prof. Paulsen remarks, is that being is life, *inner* life. His merit was to demonstrate how, ultimately, all reality must be referred to self-consciousness; to make explicit what was implicit in Kant's notion of the unity of apperception. "The final notion of Fichte's philosophy," says Prof. Adamson, "expressed more clearly in the later works than in the *Wissenschaftslehre*, has been seen to be that of the divine or spirit-

ual order of which finite spirits are the manifestation or realization, and in the light of which human life and its surroundings appear as the continuous progress in ever higher stages towards the realization of the final end of reason. Under this conception, the oppositions of thought which play so important a part in philosophy—Being and Thought, Mind and Nature, Soul and Body, Freedom and Law, Natural Inclination and Moral Effort, Mechanism and Teleology—are reconciled. They appear in their due place as different aspects of the several stages in and through which the spiritual order is realized. But, as has also been seen, the element wanting in Fichte's system is the definite recognition between this view of the spiritual development of reason and the natural, historical development of nature and humanity."⁸

For this neglect of and often contempt on the part of Fichte for the riches of intelligence as revealed in the forms of nature and history, in other words, of "experience," his system has been accused of being pure subjective idealism—a charge that is not altogether without foundation. Support from experience to the essential principle of his idealism was to be brought from nature by Schelling, from history by Hegel.

Fichte's chief concern lay in the sphere of the practical reason. Accordingly, he did not go further than to speak of nature as merely not-I. The noumenon of Kant still haunts his system. It was Schelling's endeavor to supplement Fichte in this regard and exhibit nature as an intelligible system, as a function or process of intelligence towards self-consciousness as its necessary goal; *i. e.*, to show its essential oneness with the ego as intelligent, and not, as Descartes had done, as the dead antithesis of conscious thought. "Matter," says Schelling, "is the universal seed-

⁸ Fichte (In Blackwood's *Philosophical Classics*), p. 219 f.

corn of the universe, in which is wrapped up everything that unfolds itself in the later development." We thus come to see that nature and personality are not two things, but are correlatives rather; yet not *merely* correlatives. "They are members of one great organism of intelligence."⁹ Thus for Schelling as for Herbert Spencer the force which permeates nature is the same as that which finds expression in the world of mind. In his "Identity Philosophy," however, he returned to the position of Spinoza, in which subject and object, mind and nature, are regarded as parallel developments of equal importance and value. All difference is merged in absolute oneness. He finds nothing in spirit but what he found in nature. Thus he came to hold what seems to be the characteristic doctrine of all pantheism and naturalism—the principle, that is, which regards subject as the mere correlative of object, self-consciousness of nature, that the spiritual and material world are two "sides of the same shield," and "imply each other *equally*." In the small treatise of 1804 "Philosophy and Religion," Schelling puts forth clearly and distinctly the doctrine that the existence of the universe is not essential to the Absolute; rather its relation to the latter is one of mere accident. This is Spinoza's conception of the Absolute as mere blank, *indeterminate* being, and in returning to this position, Schelling resigned the real import of idealism in which the idea of God is that of a self-determining principle, the source and life of all the manifold determinations of the universe.

§ 15. About Hegel, as about every other philosopher, the essential question must be, what was his problem and what his method? Briefly stated, his problem was to discover the nature of that unity which is the underlying principle of the spheres of nature and mind, and to indicate with all possible comprehensiveness how this Reality reveals itself as the in-

⁹ Seth, *From Kant to Hegel*, p. 57.

dwelling life of science, art, morality and religion. "From all periods of the world," says Wallace of Oxford, "from mediaeval piety and stoical pride, Kant and Sophocles, science and art, religion and philosophy, Hegel gathers in the vineyards of the human spirit the grapes from which he crushes the wine of thought." The vital part of the Critical philosophy is the perception that the Absolute is not substance but self-conscious spirit; that is, the unity of self-consciousness is the principle to which all things are to be referred, and in which they must ultimately find their explanation. To this result all previous philosophy tended. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Fichte and Schelling (to name merely those who were more conscious of the tendency than others) all strove towards that idealism which finds the interpretation of existence in self-consciousness. Conscious spirit is the ideal end and real pre-supposition of the universe. In other words, if there exists a universe, a cosmos, God is; and God is Spirit because the universe exists.

The answer, then, to the question how Hegel came to his notion of spirit? is not far to seek. The entire previous development was organic to his system and exists as its pre-supposition. Yet this detracts nothing from his originality. Rather the reverse is true. Hegel saw the vital spirit of previous philosophy and was in earnest with his discovery. What he endeavored to show was that in spite of all their apparent conflicts the kingdoms of nature and of spirit are essentially one; or rather, that this conflict was but "the self-appointed manifestation of their ultimate unity."¹⁰ In what precedes we have tried to indicate how and when these various conflicts have arisen in philosophy. They were rather phases of the one conflict of spirit with nature. We have also seen how, previous to this, mind was the absolute

¹⁰ Eucken, *The Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophic Thought* (Trans. by Phelps) p. 16.

opposite of matter, spirit of nature, freedom of necessity, the individual of society, the Infinite of the finite, faith of knowledge, the knowable of the unknowable. It was Hegel's task, and herein consists the vital and valuable element in his philosophy, to show that the one is but the truth of the other; that soul is the truth of the body, freedom of necessity, the individual of society, the Infinite of the finite. "The *central* object of the Hegelian system is by no means mystical or repellent, and lies sufficiently close to men's interests to demand careful inquiry. For it is nothing else than an attempt to show that all thought is, on its human side, a gradual approximation to God, and on its Divine side, a gradual revelation of His own nature. And the means by which the result is sought to be obtained is nothing else than an unflinching belief in Reason, and in its power to correct the imperfect notions of logic and science, in its power to construct and justify ideas of its own, in its irrefragable and absolute authority."¹¹ Reason for Hegel is the immanent principle of the world.

The principle of Identity had been the watchword of previous philosophy. Matter was matter and mind was mind: and mind and matter were absolutely opposed. Hegel arrived at the principle of his entire system by a consideration of the very nature of the self-conscious and self-determining spirit. The implications of this method had been only imperfectly grasped by Kant and Fichte. Hegel recognized that self-consciousness is the unity to which every manifold must be referred. But he was the first to show that thought or self-consciousness is founded upon difference: that consciousness is a "many-in-one"—an organic whole, a unity in which the opposition between the self and the external world is overcome. Again, behind the necessity of nature Kant found a noumenal world for the free

¹¹ Courtney, *Studies in Philosophy*.

play of man's spiritual life. To this dualism or other-worldliness, Hegel opposes the freedom of necessity; only through the transformation of our natural impulses, affections and desires can the spirit accomplish its freedom, *i. e.*, through a world which at first appears the very opposite of spirit, and along the beaten highways of this common world lies the way which leads to the everlasting life."

§ 16. For Hegel, Logic and Metaphysics are identical. Logic, he tells us, is "the all-animating spirit of all the sciences, and its categories the spiritual hierarchy." In reality there is no passing over "the ugly broad-ditch" from thought to nature and spirit. The categories never existed otherwise than in nature and spirit. They are equally objective and subjective. Reason is an organism: for us there is but one reason and one universe, and the universe exists as the manifestation of that reason. This is anthropomorphism; but it is not to be lost sight of that without some form of anthropomorphism, we must give allegiance to thorough-going agnosticism. Everything we attribute to existence—the existence of the atom even—is a reflection of our own spirit—the spirit is back of it all.

Logic, then, is the study of the pure thought-forms (pure in the sense that they are ideally separated for purposes of examination) which are embodied in nature and spirit, whose animating principles they are. Hegel attempts to prove in the Logic that the ultimate unity of the world is spiritual by showing how the various categories, through which we are accustomed to explain the world—being, measure, essence, force, substance—hypostatized aspects of reality, and as "interlocked moments" passing into each other through their own immanent dialectic, resolve themselves into that of self-consciousness or spirit. There is no positive without a

¹² A somewhat fuller account of the ethical development from Kant to Hegel will be given in a succeeding chapter.

negative, and only through this antithesis is advance made to a higher synthesis. It is affirmation, through negation to reaffirmation with enriched content. "Through death to life," is the fundamental conception of the Hegelian Logic, as we shall find it to be also the vital and informing principle of his Ethics. "An immanent negativity" is the "ground of advance, the very soul of the world-march." The Logic leads up to the Absolute Idea which is the perfect form of that relation we are conscious of as existing between subject and object, between a knower and his knowledge.¹³

§ 17. As has been noted above, nature is, for Hegel, not the mere co-equal of spirit. It is "petrified intelligence"—thought externalized. Or rather it is the necessary manifestation of spirit in the sense that through nature spirit realizes itself. The universe is in externality what God is in internality. "Nature is in herself the process of the evolution of the spirit from her own bosom; and consequently embodies the spiritual presence throughout." Aristotle and Schelling found the principle of the world in Absolute Spirit as pure self-consciousness (pure form opposed to the finite world). For Hegel, God is that Absolute Spirit which is being realized in the world, and in whom we live and move and have our being; through whom and to whom are all things.

In the philosophy of nature Hegel's purpose is to show how, starting from the conception of nature which regards it as pure externality in space, it manifests more and more explicitly through its rising spiral of mechanism, chemism and organism, until it unfolds its essential nature—its truth

¹³ Prof. Watson (*The Problem of Hegel, Philosophical Review*, Vol. III.) well remarks: "Herbert Spencer says the true Reality must be beyond the distinction of subject and object, and that of it we can only affirm *that it is*—without being able to define in the least *what* is is. Now Hegel in showing that pure 'being' is pure nothing has refuted this doctrine by anticipation. The Absolute of Spencer is simply Hegelian 'being,' of which we cannot even affirm that it is, without contradicting ourselves."

—in mind. Thus in nature thought is objectified. The categories are the constitutive and regulative principles of objectivity and of the thinking subject. Thus nature is intelligible and man intelligent, that is, nature is organic to intelligence, and exists only in the life of spirit. The Absolute, on whom subject and object, intelligence and the intelligible world, are in living organic dependence, is an Absolute Spirit. The material world in its source and goal exists as the manifestation of a living Spiritual Activity. "All that God is He imparts and reveals, and He does so at first in and through nature."¹⁴

§ 18. "From our point of view," says Hegel, "mind or spirit has for its *presupposition* nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason its *absolute prius*. In this its truth nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the "Idea" entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one—either is the intelligent unity, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity—for whereas in nature the intelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externalization has been nullified, and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it *is* this identity only so far as it is a return out of nature."¹⁵

One of Christianity's best gifts to philosophy was to show that nature, instead of being essentially evil and opposed to spirit, is, in reality, the very means through which must be realized the highest spiritual life; that, in other words, nature exists for spirit. Hegel more than any preceding philosopher, by his thorough appreciation of the ethical and religious significance of Christianity, saw the implication of this truth. In this respect, Browning is in the realm of poetry what Hegel is in that of philosophy. It is this which gives

¹⁴ *Werke*, VI, § 140. (Wallace's Translation.)

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, VII, § 381. (Wallace's Translation.)

to the philosophy of the one, as it does to the poetry of the other, its essential healthfulness and spiritual vitality. Nature like mind is rational, but through consciousness mind spiritualizes and informs nature as an instrument of its purposes. From this point of view man at once completes and transcends nature. "All tended to mankind, and man produced, all has its end thus far." Born into the world at a certain point of time, man's life is a process of thought and action—finding himself at home in the world. In knowing the external world, and identifying himself with the ethical substance, he comes gradually to the fulfilment of the command *γινώθι σεαυτόν*—first to know and therewith to be himself—to feel his calling to be that of a co-worker in the realization of the divine purpose "to which the whole creation moves."

"Progress is man's distinctive mark alone,
Not God's and not the beast's. God is, they are,
Man partly is and wholly hopes to be,"¹⁶

It is to this conception of the world that we have been brought by this brief and imperfect introduction to Hegel's philosophy, namely, the consciousness of the identity of the power without and the power within; that the necessity, the machinery of nature and of the institutions in which the human mind has expressed itself, is but the manifestation, the organic evolution, of the same spiritual principle by which man is raised to conscious freedom. And in the spiritual life of man is continued the revelation of the Absolute Spirit, which, as Hegel says, "was begun in nature." "God dwells in all," says Browning, "from life's minute beginnings up at last to man. . . ."

But in completed man begins anew
A tendency to God."

¹⁶ Browning, *A Death in the Desert*.

CHAPTER III

CONSCIOUSNESS

§ 19. In the preceding chapter we endeavored to trace the gradual emergence in the history of thought of the various problems for which Hegel sought a comprehensive principle of explanation. Thought or intelligence is an organism and in its history has developed into varied and complex forms. One-sided embodiments have been passed by in its onward course, yet the existence of which depended on their having within them some element of truth. Materialism and idealism, the necessity of nature and the freedom implied in the commands of our moral nature, unbelief and faith, the individual and society—does Hegel afford us any assistance in inclining our minds to the truth of the claims of each of these? Such a question cannot be answered at the present stage of this essay and never dogmatically. It may be said that philosophy, like poetry, answers no questions. Its function is rather to rectify our mind's attitude towards those questions which the mind itself proposes. Existence can be adequately solved only in a life. Philosophy may serve at least to free us from arbitrary notions and fruitless questions.

Development was found to be the key-word of Hegel's philosophy. Mind *comes forth* from nature, of which it is the truth or realization. Hegel here brings us face to face with the central point of modern philosophical controversy. Ordinarily we conceive the soul a spiritual substance inserted as an extraneous principle at some definite point in

the growth of the body, which we regard as a material substance. Biology, at present busy with the application of the law of development to mental phenomena, shows that such a notion must be qualified. The physical organism, we are told has been evolved: and our intellectual and moral nature also bears traces of development. May not consciousness itself have been evolved also? In this chapter it remains briefly to inquire in what sense Hegel would permit the application of the idea of development to human consciousness.

§ 20. We may conceive the development of consciousness to take place in one of three ways; (1) Consciousness in its last analysis is a product; the development of the mind is a development entirely from without. "Mental phenomena," says Lewes, "are functions of the organism," and "the organism is a part of nature and is swept along in the great current of natural forces."¹ Thus for Lewes, thought is itself an ultimate development of matter. A few pages previous (p. 74), he had admitted that "the conquest of modern speculation is that our world arises in consciousness;" he began by asserting that the material substance was only such through consciousness, and ended by making it a quality of the same material substance; and this is the fundamental difficulty of all materialistic explanations. We can gain an intelligible expression of matter and force in terms of thought, but no such expression of thought or consciousness in terms of matter and force. "You cannot get," says Principal Caird, "to mind as an ultimate product of matter, for in the very attempt to do so, you have already begun with mind."² Again, "that notion of Force or Physical Causality, from which the materialist would construct the world independently of mind, is itself a creation or cate-

¹ *Study of Psychology*, p. 103.

² *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 88.

gory of mind, and instead of looking for thought or mental energy as the final product into which force is convertible, we must regard force as itself something which exists only for thought."³

Those who conceive consciousness to be a function of the nervous system have called attention to the intimate connection that increasing knowledge discloses between the psychical and physical processes; to the principle which is the highest generalization reached in science—the conservation of energy; the sum of real motion, they assert, and of motive force is constant; and life and consciousness having had beginnings are therefore products—the result of physical processes. Thus they find it possible to pass from the inorganic to the organic, and from the organic to the conscious, without calling in the aid of any principle other than that of force. Darwin speaks of an *a priori* tendency of the individual to maintain itself in the struggle for existence. Where, we may ask, did this self-causation or self-development come from? The criterion of existence for modern thought is activity, and thus, at a stroke, the conception of the mind as a *tabula rasa* is brushed aside as intolerable. By no flight of imagination can we conceive that *everything* comes into a thing from without. How then explain this organic unity "which maintains itself by continuous self-differentiation and integration?" The most perfect unity is that of self-consciousness, for in it all externality has disappeared and the principle of force is still less applicable than in the phenomena of life. Force can exist only between two things external to each other. But in consciousness, its very nature is in the fact that externality has vanished, and for it such a principle as force exists as a relation. Thus the question returns upon us, how can consciousness arise from that for the existence and constitution of which conscious-

³ *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 93.

ness is necessary? It is not necessary to deny the existence of matter; to understand it is our single duty. The vital principle of evolution is that any reality is understood only in the totality of its development. Whatever, then, is subsequently evolved must have been originally involved. "But this is a view of the world which spiritualizes matter rather than materializes mind; for in the whole realm of being down to the lowest existence in outward nature, it leaves nothing absolutely foreign to thought, nothing which, either actually or virtually, thought cannot claim as its own."⁴

(2) A second conception of the application of the idea of development to the soul is Leibnitz's "Pre-established" harmony between soul-life and the life of the world. This can only be mentioned in passing. It may with fairness be said that all would now admit a certain power of determination from both inner and outer. We pass, therefore, to the (3) conception—that of Hegel—which regards the life of consciousness, of the soul, as a self-development, or self-determination through environment, and after what has already been said we may here be very brief.

§ 21. For Hegel, as we have seen, the real is the intelligible, and the intelligible the real. Aristotle had reached this doctrine when he conceived "the reason of man to be a pure universal or universal *divinus*, the evolution of which to complete self-consciousness is one with the process whereby the objective world comes to be known:" yet he was unable to maintain himself at the height of this conception. Starting out with the admission of a material principle essentially different from the principle of reason, this, if consistently carried out, would bring him to a religion of annihilation, and a freedom not won by overcoming the world, but by a complete withdrawal from its influence.

For the doctrine that the real is the intelligible and the

⁴ Caird, *loc. cit.* p. 110.

intelligible the real, Kant prepared the way by showing that without a subject there exists no object; that existence has meaning only for a thinking self. Even granting the *a posteriori*, as against the *a priori*, origin of conceptions; admitting also the entire Associationist psychology, yet in some way these conceptions are immanent in experience, and are still the rational constitutive principles of the universe. So that the individual in coming to self-consciousness through reaction with the world of nature, shows that the principles at work in his consciousness are identical with those involved in the constitution of nature. Kant and his successors, then, could accept with gratitude whatever the biologist may tell us of the dependence of soul-life on the organism. They could accept as a matter of course the development from feeling or sensation as traced by the Empiricists. The Scientist and the Idealist are one in their abiding faith that the world is rational at the core.

From this standpoint it is clearly erroneous to speak of the conscious rational being as such, in spite of the necessary relation it bears to influences of environment, as in any absolute sense determined from without. Such an idealistic theory of the internal and external world enables us to see their essential unity, and recognize the relative nature of any distinction between self-determination and determination through environment. Since this environment or the external world is the manifestation of reason, it thus, though at first presenting itself under the form of contingency and as a hindrance, comes to be recognized as the very condition under which the development of the individual conscious spirit is accomplished. Thought then, Hegel would say, is an eternal process of self-manifestation and self-realization, which in its necessary evolution reveals itself as force, and manifests itself in the various forms of existence and laws of phenomena, natural and spiritual. So that the history of a

conscious spirit, in its relations with the environment, physical, ethical, religious, into which it is born, is not a struggle between two independent and unrelated forces, but, as Prof. Edward Caird expresses it, "the evolution by antagonism of a spiritual principle." Thus it is seen that ultimately it is for the creation of the Person that environment exists. Man has within him a principle which, finding itself at home in nature, erects him above nature, and in turn enables him to recognize his oneness with the Eternal and Absolute Subject, the Infinite Spirit for whom both nature and the individual spirit exist. From this standpoint, also, as Lange says, "man's conscious life remains still a problem when all the consequences of Darwinism have been granted."

Hegel, t' en, would assent to Lewes' statement that the triumph of modern speculation is that the world arises in consciousness, but would understand it differently. He would not deny the existence of matter; yet he would insist on a clear understanding of what is meant by it. If the external world in space and time exist only for a self-conscious subject, consciousness can no longer be regarded as a product of that world. Materialism formerly asserted that matter was the creative condition of force; now it asserts that force is the creative condition of matter. Idealism accepts this, seeing in force nothing but a function of spirit, since force is in a conditioned relation to space and time, which are themselves spiritual functions. The kingdoms of nature and spirit are organically one and inseparable. "Spirit," as President Schurman expresses it, "is the eternal reality, and nature its eternal manifestation."⁵

⁵ *Belief in God.*

CHAPTER IV

SUBJECTIVE MIND

§ 22. In the "Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences," which is the only "complete, matured, and authentic statement of Hegel's philosophical system,"¹ the subject matter of philosophy is distributed under the three main heads—(1) Logic, (2) Philosophy of Nature, and (3) Philosophy of Mind. "It is this third part," says Prof. Wallace, "or rather it is the last two divisions therein (embracing the great general interests of humanity, such as law and morals, religion and art, as well as the development of philosophy itself) which forms the topics of Hegel's most expanded teaching, and is the most interesting part of Hegel."

If Hegel has a metaphysical basis of ethics—a philosophy of right, of the state and of history—he also has a psychology. The Philosophy of Mind has to do primarily with the world of intelligence and of humanity. It is the philosophy of man, *i. e.*, psychology in its broadest sense; which, as Herbart says, shoots its roots into the sciences of life, and blossoms in the historical sciences. The Philosophy of Mind is subdivided into the three parts—(1) Subjective, (2) Objective, and (3) Absolute Mind. It demonstrates the several stages of that development by which man makes explicit what was implicit in his nature from the first. Beginning with the individual as a sentient organism, a mere bit of nature so to speak, it shows how, from the first letting into the soul through feeling of the infinite secret of the uni-

¹ Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, p. xi.

verse, step by step the individual, "rounded to a separate mind," advances to completed freedom by coming into conscious relationship with the intelligible world, the ethical substance, and finally into conformity with the Divine immanence. Man at first is a mere bundle of sensations and impulses. Out of these he is to construct his intellectual and moral world, and thus realize in himself that freedom which is the birthright of spirit. It is in this broad sense of the realization of the human spirit that we are to understand Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, and in which his doctrine of the will consists. In this essay we are concerned with the first two divisions of the Philosophy of Mind, namely, Subjective and Objective Mind, or as they may be named, Psychology and Ethics. Under the first designation Hegel would understand the development of the individual mind from its naturalness to formal freedom; under the second, the mind as it determines itself in its action by the idea of the good.

(1) The first of the sub-divisions of the Philosophy of Mind—Subjective Mind—considers, as has been said, the subject-matter of what is generally termed Psychology, and includes Anthropology, Phenomenology, and Psychology.

(2) The field of Objective Mind includes man's rationality—as externally organized in the domestic, social, and political relations of human beings. (3) "Absolute Mind" exhibits man in the perfection of his moral and spiritual character. Hegel ever remained the sworn enemy of abstraction. You cannot abstract man from his natural and social relations. He is born into them, and not by withdrawal from, but through such relations, does man realize his nature. Yet only in so far as the individual reacts upon environment is there any interest whatever for us. It is man as subject to natural conditions that constitutes the subject-matter of Anthropology.

(a) *Anthropology*

§ 23. The mind as soul is physically conditioned. What Hegel calls Anthropology is the science at the present time more generally known as "Physiological Psychology"—the soul in its relations to the body. "The end of nature is to destroy itself, to break through the immediate sensible covering, and, like the phoenix from its flame, to arise from this externality—new born as spirit." Spirit is the being-with-self (*Beisichsein*) of the Idea. The meaning of this, in the light of what precedes, will now be clear. The Idea has returned from its self-alienation to self; and the development which spirit undergoes is the gradual advance from natural determinateness to freedom. The soul for Hegel is no separate immaterial entity. Wherever there is nature, there is soul as its immanent, ideal life. "Soul is the *substance* or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought, and the soul remains the pervading, identical ideality of it all. But as it is conceived thus abstractly the soul is only the *sleep* of mind—the passive *νοῦς* of Aristotle—which is potentially all things."² For Hegel, holding the conception of reality he does, the question of the immateriality of the soul can have no interest and little meaning. Such a question has meaning only for those who maintain what Lotze calls "that simple and thorough division of reality, which places matter on one side and the mind on the other, confident and full of faith in regard to the former, timid and doubtful about the latter."³ "We need no more ask," says Aristotle, "whether the soul and body are one, than whether the wax and the impression stamped upon it are so."⁴ Plato had separated the soul

¹ *Werke*, VII, § 389. (Wallace's Translation.)

² *Metaphysic* (English Translation, Vol. II., p. 190.)

⁴ *De Anima*, II, 1, 412, b. 8.

from its bodily environment. Aristotle, though he did not realize all the import of the conception, made soul the truth of body: yet it was by no means the product of physiological conditions: rather, it was the *truth* of body, the *ousia*, in which alone do the bodily conditions gain their real meaning. It remains a unity throughout the various stages of its development.

Before its emergence as mind, the soul passes through three stages, designated by Hegel the Natural or Physical, the Feeling, and the Actual Soul. (1) The physical soul is as it were an *anima mundi*, a world-soul, still in sympathy with the influences of the universe. The lower down in the scale of development the more complete is this sympathy with the cosmic life. This soul universal is "rather the universal *substance*," as Hegel says, "which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects." Next we find the general planetary life of the nature-governed mind specialized into divisions in accordance with the nature of the geographical continents, thereby producing the varieties of race. Next the soul is further deuniversalized into the individualized subject—individual in reference only to special talent, temperament, character and physiognomy, of families or single individuals. In the development of the soul as an individual or permanent subject, Hegel marks the four stages—and here he speaks only in the most general terms of the individual life—namely, childhood, when mind is wrapped up in itself; youth, the period of storm and stress; manhood, the period of the individual's true relation to its environment; and lastly, old age, the period of freedom from the strain of the outward present. What the life of the individual consists in is rising out of the abstract and undeveloped "in himself," through physical, mental and moral control, and becoming "for himself" what he is at first only "in himself" or potentially—a free and reasonable being.

(2) The feeling or sentient individual is the simple "ideality" or subjective side of sensation. Its individuality is yet merely formal: it is not yet a true self or subject, and is therefore passive. "Everything," says Hegel, "is in sensation; if you will, everything that emerges in conscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation; for source and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears."⁵ The sentient life serves as the substratum of the self-conscious, intelligent and willing soul. The individual subject at first immersed, as it were, in its sensations, desires, instincts and passions, gradually comes to give these a place as *its own* in itself. In this way emerges a *self-feeling* (*Selbstgefühl*), but a self-feeling only in the *particular feeling*—one quite different from that of the fully furnished self of intelligent self-consciousness. The subject has not yet learned to duly subordinate particular feelings and desires; whilst the intelligent subject has the consciousness of his intellectual and moral world in an ordered whole, into the system of which is subsumed each particular idea, feeling, or desire as it arises. It is through habit that these various feelings group themselves about the common centre—the soul, which in time moves among them, so to speak, without consciousness of the fact, and is thus disengaged for further advancement in its mental life. "Habit," says Hegel, "is the mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence . . . it is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence, will, *etc.*, so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical existence. . . . The main point about habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from the feelings, even in being affected by them."⁶ The feelings and impulses are thus subordinated and controlled by the individual.

⁵ *Werke*, VII, § 400 (*Philosophy of Mind*, Wallace's Translation).

⁶ *Ibid.*, § 410 (*Philosophy of Mind*, Wallace's Translation).

(3) The soul becomes actual when the body has been appropriated and made its instrument; the various parts of the body being made organic to its central aim. The soul thus becomes a *single* subject, of which the body is the sign. The soul thus through the self-relation of the various feelings and desires arrives at a higher stage of its development in that these have become the object for a subject—a subject with a world external to it. Reflected thus into its ideality the soul rises to become consciousness.

(b) *Phenomenology of Mind*

§ 24. Consciousness as such is the relation of the Ego to an object, which may be internal or external. The sentient soul was conscious, but only in a dim way; it had feelings, yet was scarcely aware that it had them. As more distinctively consciousness, the soul separates itself from what it feels, and as subject is conscious of an object. We thus reach the second stage in Hegel's account of the development of subjective mind—the point of view that subject and object imply one another equally. The aim of the conscious mind is to really see itself as the subject for which the object exists, and to which the latter is organic; as Hegel says, "to make its appearance identical with its essence, to raise its self-certainty to truth."

The stages in the development are three in number: (1) Consciousness as such (*Das Bewusstsein als solches*); (2) Self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*); and (3) rational self-consciousness, the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness (*Die Vernunft*), "where the mind sees itself embodied in the object, and sees itself as implicitly and explicitly determinate, as Reason, the notion of the mind."⁷ Under these three stages Hegel includes the manifestations of the mind in sensuous consciousness, perception, under-

⁷ *Werke*, VII, § 417 (*Philosophy of Mind*, Wallace's Translation).

standing, self-consciousness, and reason. The sense-consciousness is wealthiest in matter, but poorest in thought. Gradually it separates itself from the object, making it a definite system of relations—a related thing, *i. e.*, perceives it. The consciousness of such an object is *intellect*. This is the consciousness active and outgoing, rather than a mere *tabula rasa*, receptive and passive; it is self-consciousness as the truth of consciousness, making me aware of myself and of the object as mine. This, for Hegel, is the impulsive, dynamic or practical aspect of consciousness, freeing itself from its sensuousness, and realizing itself through the object. From the point of view of consciousness the object is *merely* its relative other. But from the standpoint of self-consciousness or reason it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other.

(c) *Psychology*

§ 25. In the Anthropology the soul was viewed in its natural character from the standpoint of Spinoza. In the Phenomenology it was regarded from the Fichtean point of view, as Ego distinguishing itself from nature; and now in the Psychology mind is regarded by Hegel as the truth of the soul and of consciousness, that is, the synthesis of the two preceding points of view; not as the mere negation of objectivity, but as reconciled and in alliance with it, thus attaining the freedom which is the essence of spirit; as intelligence finding itself in the objects it knows, and as will giving itself a content in the ends it seeks to realize. "Psychology" had already come into use as a designation for all that Hegel comprised under "subjective mind," and it would thus have been better had he omitted the term here. As it is, he regards psychology as the study of the faculties or general modes of mental activity, *quâ* mental; ideation, memory, desire, *etc.*, apart altogether from their empirical

content—regarding these as functions of the one living unity—mind. The so-called faculties are but the various stages in the process of liberation of the mind from the form of immediacy—to become an individuality, a concrete subjectivity. The process is one in which the mind finds and makes the world its own; its aspects being: (1) Theoretical mind. Intelligence is (apparently) determined from without; yet as *knowing*, it states the object of determination as its own. Its development is through the three stages: (a) intuition, (b) conception, (c) thought. (2) The practical mind, will. The mind as will is conscious of its own determination. Its stages are, (a) practical feeling, (b) impulse, (c) happiness. (3) The free mind in which they are both united. This is will as free intelligence. The mind which knows itself as free, and wills itself as its object, is the reasonable will. It is at first merely formal freedom, and this is the last word of the psychological development as traced by Hegel under "Subjective Mind." Before turning to the consideration of the content with which the self-unfolding will or mind has invested itself, we must briefly gather up the results so far gained, and understand more fully what Hegel means by the will and its freedom.

CHAPTER V

THE FREEDOM OF MAN

§ 26. HEGEL everywhere emphasizes the unity and continuity of mind. He could have no sympathy whatever with the so-called doctrine of mental faculties. The mind is a living, developing, organic unity, and completed freedom is its immanent notion. The faculties are so many phases of its evolution. "The distinction," says Hegel, "of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean that each has a fixed and separate existence of its own, as if volition could be without intelligence, or the activity of intelligence could be without will."¹ In knowledge we idealize the real, in action we realize the ideal, and both involve self-conscious activity, which for Hegel is the primary and fundamental characteristic of man. In one relation self consciousness is knowledge; in another relation it is action.

§ 27. The will, then, for Hegel, is the mind; not any separate faculty co-ordinate with other faculties. In the theoretic sphere it is the mind in search of the true; in the practical sphere, it is the mind in search of the good. Instead of speaking of freedom of will, we should speak of freedom of mind. The self-determination of self-consciousness constitutes man's freedom. The freedom of the will or mind is the freedom of the whole mind; the freedom of self-determination through the cosmos it knows (*i. e.*, the mind as intelligent subject) and in the ideals to which it is devoted (*i. e.*, the mind as choosing subject). Spontaneity is

¹ *Werke*, VII, § 445 (*The Philosophy of Mind*, Wallace's Translation).

as essential to consciousness as receptivity; it must react on impressions from the environment, just as in the moral sphere it must react by way of identification with or withdrawal from the solicitations of environment. Thus the very fact of knowledge implies freedom. The activity of consciousness as attention, apart from the activity of which, as Hegel says, there is nothing for the mind, moves freely among the elements, modifying and informing the world by its own inward nature. "Even in knowledge," says Green, "man exerts a free activity—an activity which is not in time, not a link in the chain of natural becoming, which has no antecedents other than itself, but is self-originated."² Thus the mind, by its free activity, abolishes the foreignness of the external world and makes the world *its* cosmos. Intelligence is thus essentially a process, a free activity to which the known world is organic. Intelligence and will are but the action and counter-action of the one living, organizing unity—mind. In so far as it appropriates its determined content, the world of objects, the mind is theoretical intelligence. But in so far as it goes on to determine its own content and constitute its own ideals, it is intelligence as practical; it is will, and has entered on a new stage of self-realization. The freedom of will is thus in thought, and the will can make itself objective as it becomes a thinking will, to create its own universe out of its own inmost nature. "These two sides of man's nature," says Prof. Watson,—“his intelligence and his will—his consciousness of the world and his consciousness of himself—do not develop independently of each other; for as man learns to comprehend the meaning of the world he also learns to comprehend himself.”³ For Hegel the very essence of the mind is what it becomes through its own activity: it is not a substance but a subject; it is the *form*

² *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 82.

³ *Comte, Mill and Spencer*, p. 150.

of its intellectual and moral environment; in both of which it is striving for the revelation of its ideal.

§ 28. The will is then the entire human consciousness on its active side. It is consciousness as it attends to a stimulus, and as it realizes the highest ideal of reason. Yet it is far from being thinking will that mind in the first instance appears as consciousness. Some account of this has been given in the preceding chapter. It is first in a state of nature; yet it is not something merely natural. To begin with, the individual has sensations, inclinations and impulses, in common with the animals, and these are the first materials of his self-unfolding. Since, however, the essential self of the individual is constituted by the universal, spiritual principle of Reason, the sensations are not *mere* sensations, nor the appetites *mere* appetites. Reason implicit gradually becomes explicit. The sensations are, through the unifying activity of the self-conscious subject, made perceptions; that is, they are given their place in the subject's comprehension of the meaning of the world; and in virtue of the same spiritual principle there emerges in consciousness not mere appetites, but desires for the fuller realization of the conscious life. As Hegel remarks of the impulses and inclinations: "The immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy, and gives their content a rationality and objectivity, in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation, as rights and duties."⁴ "Each individual has a life of its own only in so far as it exhibits within itself the life that is implied in the world as a whole. The life of the individual is thus one phase of the universal life that pulsates through all existence."⁵

Thus the life of sensation and impulse is the substratum

⁴ *Werke*, VII, § 474 (*The Philosophy of Mind*, Wallace's Translation).

⁵ Watson, *Comte, Mill and Spencer*, p. 170.

of the life of consciousness; and apart from these, consciousness, either on the theoretical or practical side, must remain an abstraction. The life of consciousness must be the immanent and informing principle of the life of sensation and impulse, and through these create its world of the true and the good. "The motive power," as Hegel says, "is the need, instinct, inclination and passion of man."⁶ Desire, in addition to the feeling of a want, presupposes the existence of some object by which the want may be satisfied. "Impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action; they are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof." "The will," says Hegel, "as thinking will and implicitly free, distinguishes itself from the particularity of the impulses . . . the reflective will now sees the impulse as its own, because it closes with it and thus gives itself specific individuality and actuality. It is now on the standpoint of *choosing* between inclinations, and is option or *choice*."⁷ This, in brief, is Hegel's answer to those who assert the determination of the will by motives. The self-presenting subject has within itself the idea of an end to be realized, and the adoption by the subject of a particular impulse as the means for the realization of the idea of his good is the subject's self-expression. "The will is free, just because it is determined by motives:"⁸ or as President Schurman says, "whoever reflects that a motive is really an idea and that an idea has no existence apart from the subject that has it, must object to the comparison of man and his motives to a balance and its weights. The former is a merely ideal, the latter a real duality. Man is nothing, apart from his ideas, but the weights and the balance have each an independent existence."⁹

⁶ *Philosophy of History*, Translated by Sibree, p. 23.

⁷ *Werke*, VII, § 476-7 (*The Philosophy of Mind*, Wallace's Translation).

⁸ D'Arcy, *Short Study of Ethics*, p. 38.

⁹ *Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution*, p. 15.

Gradually the individual will or the self attains, through reflection and comparison, to the idea of a universal satisfaction, or of happiness. "Their mutual limitations (that is, of impulses)," says Hegel, "on one hand, proceed from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand, as happiness has its sole *affirmative* contents in the springs of action, it is on them that the decision turns, as it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which must have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed."¹⁰ Thus for Hegel the domain of psychology extends as far as what may be called the formal freedom of the individual seeking happiness in the satisfaction of the wants and impulses: and Eudemonism is accordingly assigned its systematic position in the exposition of his doctrine. So far, however, no reference has been made to the content of the will—the intrinsic worth of the inclinations and impulses. Which are good, and which bad? As soon as this is done, psychology becomes merged in ethics; the treatment passes from the conception of happiness to the most general of the entire practical sphere—the conception of the good.

§ 29. For Hegel, man's individuality is owing to the relation which he of necessity bears to nature and society. It is through these that his isolation grows defined. The notion of individuality is to bring this environment into organic unity: the person is to become the truth of the natural and the social. The will is the man as activity—as self-determining. Since, then, self-consciousness is first of all a consciousness of the self as opposed to the world of objects or nature, and especially, as Prof. Watson says, to other self-conscious beings, it follows that the satisfaction of the individual self can not be found in self-centered isolation from nature and other self-conscious beings. It is through its relations to the world and to other human beings that the

¹⁰ *Werke*, VII, § 479 (*The Philosophy of Mind*, Wallace's Translation).

individual consciousness is made capable of a universal life, one transcending the limits of mere individuality. It is through these relations that the universal life or reason must find expression. As Principal Caird says, "Morality, or the moral life, may be described as the renunciation of the private or exclusive self and the identification of our life with an ever-widening sphere of spiritual life beyond us."¹¹ Thus Hegel provides for the satisfaction of the individual happiness in the very union of the universal and particular. The individual in living for his family or for the state 'at once wills the good and finds his happiness in realizing it.' Man is in reality a member of the state before he is a man. Self-realization is man's supreme end, but is possible only through other selves; through renunciation of the individual self in favor of the universal, truer self, of which the family, society, the state, are the reflection. "It must further be understood," says Hegel, "that all the worth which the human being possesses, all spiritual reality, he possesses only through the state. For his spiritual reality consists in this, that his own essence—Reason—is objectively present to him, that it possesses objective immediate existence for him. Thus only is he fully conscious; thus only is he a partaker of morality—of a just and moral, social and political life. The state is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth."¹²

Law is the objectivity of spirit; volition is its true form. Only that will which obeys law is free. For Hegel freedom comes only through perfected obedience. Will as self-realization is the very essence of the individual. Its development from its natural condition to that of formal freedom is a continuous growth in self-determination and self-expression. The mind is only that which it attains by its own efforts: it makes itself *actually* what it was always *potentially*.

¹¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 263-4.

¹² *The Philosophy of History* (Sibree, p. 41).

The realization of its idea—freedom—"is mediated by consciousness and will." As nature was found to be the deposit of reason, so human institutions are the product of the free spirit of man as thinking will working in conformity with the Divine immanence. They represent the stage of self-realization to which the human spirit has come. This ethical substance is the environment into which the individual is born to develop into the stature of the perfect man. So that beyond the mere fact of physical control and of intellectual progress through habit, language, etc., which Hegel traces under "subjective mind" or psychology, there is that of the moral life, the co-ordination of all the impulses and propensities into a system, for which "subjective" mind has been a preparation. The moral life is accomplished by the self-presenting subject, transmuting its merely individual wants and impulses into organic elements of the larger self to be achieved in the wider life of the social organism.

§ 30. For Hegel, accordingly, it is impossible to explain the nature of the individual without having regard always to the varied relations of the family, school, society and state, into which he is born. These relations, or institutions, are the embodiments so far made by man of his conception of his capabilities; and the individual, in virtue of the spiritual principle of reason within him, reflects upon and responds to the reason without him embodied in these

"Relations dear, and all the charities
Of father, son and brother."¹³

Hegel's conception is altogether at variance with the individualist theory of society. All the instincts and desires by which the individual is actuated pre-suppose some kind of organized society, of family, clan or tribe. The holding of property, for example, one of the earliest steps in social

¹³ *Paradise Lost*, Bk. IV.

organization, implies protection of it for the individual. It is thus one stage in the evolution of the idea of a common good.

If we restrict the term to its ordinary significance, it is true that Hegel never wrote a separate treatise on ethics. This fact, however, is but another instance of his dislike of abstraction. For him the living personality of man is a unit—"all of one piece," and in so far, and in whatever way man seeks to realize his capabilities, he is ethical. The moral or ethical is for Hegel the sphere of freedom; whatever is moral is essentially free, and whatever is free is moral. The development from soul to mind is a growth in freedom—it is the mind acting more and more from itself as centre. We may say, therefore, that the entire *Philosophy of Mind* is a treatise on ethics. The second part of the *Philosophy of Mind*, "Objective" Mind, is more fully elaborated in a separate treatise, the "*Philosophie des Rechts*,"¹⁴ which shows us the mind in its freedom as thinking will incarnating itself in the ethical substance—the laws, customs, morals, and social life of the world. Just as in the realm of knowledge, so in that of practice, the world, which at first is a "foreign" other, a natural world, is transformed into a social and political world by man as an intelligent and volitional being; and it is this scientific evolution of will, or of man as thinking will, which is, according to Hegel, alone capable of yielding a philosophy of law, rights and duties.

The ideal, then, for Hegel is not only personal, it is also social. As was noted above, self consciousness is the primary and fundamental fact of human nature. It is an organic, spiritual unity. It transcends the antithesis of sub-

¹⁴ *The Philosophy of Rights or Law*, published by Hegel in 1821, *Werke*, VIII. *The Philosophy of Mind*, (the third part of the *Encyclopaedia*), *Werke*, VII, was published in 1817.

ject and object, mind and matter. The object cannot be—as Descartes and so many others in the history of philosophy abstractly conceived it—the absolute antithesis of subject, nor matter of mind, but their disparateness is transcended in self-consciousness or reason. We can thus see what answer Hegel would give to an objector denying that, while the ideal is personal, it is also social. “Mr. Kidd is therefore right,” says D’Arcy, “when, in his *Social Evolution*, he describes reason as essentially anti-social. Why should the individual subordinate his private interests to the interests of the community? Why should he deny himself pleasure that others may benefit? No purely reasonable answer can be given to these questions. If they are to be answered at all, the answer must, to some extent at all events, transcend reason, or, as Mr. Kidd puts it, be ultra-rational. Self, like a despot, dominates the whole realm of experience, and, unless mastered by some superior principle, must wage unceasing war against all who would pretend to equal authority.”¹⁵

Hegel would simply say “without object there is no subject; without nature, no spirit; without necessity, no freedom; without society, no persons as we know them.” They are but complementary sides of one fact. It is strange how writers in the interests of religion still persist in declaring for the ultra-rational “and some superior principle.” “God is not wisely trusted,” wrote T. H. Green in the spirit of Hegel, “when declared unintelligible. God is forever Reason; and His communication, His revelation, is Reason; not, however, *abstract* reason, but reason as taking a body from, and giving life to, the whole system of experience which makes the history of man. The revelation, therefore, is not made in a day, or a generation, or a century. The divine mind touches, modifies, becomes the mind of man,

¹⁵ *Short Study of Ethics*, pp. 58-9.

through a process of which mere intellectual conception is only the beginning, but of which the gradual complement is an unexhausted series of spiritual discipline through all the agencies of social life."¹⁶

§ 31. Parallel with what may be called the metaphysical development from Kant to Hegel, which has been so suggestively traced by Prof. Seth, there was the ethical development; which may be briefly characterized as a development from an abstract to a concrete, and therefore living and practicable morality. For Kant, the essence of morality is, to use the phrase of Mr. Bradley in his *Ethical Studies*, "Duty for Duty's sake." The central fact of the moral life is for Hegel, "My station and its duties." A few remarks may here be made on Kant's doctrine, which may perhaps serve to bring into clearer light the standpoint of Hegel.

Kant's theory of knowledge, in its fundamental conception, is that existence, that is, all knowable existence, is existence for a self; that is, if there is one intelligible world there can be made no absolute separation between subject and object, the spiritual and natural. The categories are not to be regarded as innate ideas imposed by the mind on an alien matter. Form must ever be the immanent life of matter. Except in abstraction they cannot exist apart. It is the dualism of nature and spirit, necessity and freedom, which Kant sought to remove. How far he was successful and how far he remained in bondage to the view he was combatting, has been briefly indicated in a previous chapter.

When we turn with Kant to the sphere of the practical reason, it will be found that there is here a corresponding dualism. His entire ethical theory rests on the fundamental fact of the moral law, spontaneously imposed on the will by reason and binding on all rational beings. Its characteristic feature is authority, and commands a man to do what is

¹⁶ *Works*, Vol. III., p. 239.

right irrespective of his inclinations. Of the inclinations Kant writes: "It must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them."¹⁷ Here is the dualism of the natural and the spiritual still hovering over the mind of Kant—a dualism between the pure idea of duty and empirical instigation of pleasure. His moral purism, accordingly, merges into rigorism, and tends to the view that duty can be duty only when it is reluctantly performed. Moreover, on Kant's own theory of knowledge for the categories there is required a sensuous content, "without it they are empty." "How," we may ask, "is volition, action according to the pure idea of duty, conceivable apart from individual appetites and desires?" The will and the thinking, feeling and desiring self cannot be conceived as thus externally related to each other. For Hegel the will is the self. In all desire it is the self seeking its expression—its realization; and self-realization cannot be accomplished through the annihilation of an integral part of its own nature, feeling and desire.

Kant, however, was always building wiser than he knew, and was in reality basing his doctrine on a deeper truth which could be fully brought to light by those who had regard to the spirit rather than to the letter of his moral theory. Kant shows us (Aristotle had caught sight of the same distinction) that to act from the consciousness of law is a thing quite different from acting as subject to law. To act from a consciousness of law is to will, that is, to be free. Yet man is a unit, an organic unity, and in his desires, inclinations, impulses, must be found the material of the ideals and laws which reason proposes. It was Hegel who first clearly perceived the unity and continuity of mind. Kant presents us with two great forms, or principles of action, in accordance with which we may seek the fulfilment of our

¹⁷ *Theory of Ethics* (Abbott's translation), 3d ed., p. 46.

rational nature. (1) "Treat humanity always as an end, never as a means." Thus Kant conceives man as a person endowed with a will through which he may seek self-realization. The conception is still abstract if the self be separated from all particular desires. (2) The second amounts to this, "Whatever the special courses of conduct be in which you seek the fulfilment of your rational nature, these must be the same for all men." Here Kant approaches Hegel's point of view, the idea, namely, of humanity as a self-conscious organism, the individual members of which are at once ends and means—the truth of the universal and the particular; and man in submitting himself to the universal law of reason is in reality unfolding his own rational nature. The idea of a social organism, however, remained for Kant merely an ideal, and the conception of such an organism must ever remain a mere idea if man is a being in whom there is an irreconcilable dualism of reason and desire.

The initial difficulty with Kant is his conception that all desire is for pleasure. For Hegel, as Prof. Dewey remarks in another connection, "the spiritualizing of the impulse is organizing it so that it becomes one factor in action."¹⁸ The law is the law of the desires themselves: through it they are harmonized and made instrumental to the realization of the self which has them. Kant tells us to act as though members of a social organism. But such an organism does not exist. For Kant morality is not, nor will it ever be, realized in the community. Man must seek to realize himself not in any existing community, or any that ever will exist, but, as Prof. Watson says, "in an intelligible world which exists for him only as an unrealizable ideal."¹⁹

§ 32. Herein Hegel's doctrine is the direct antithesis of Kant's. The end of action or the good for Hegel is the

¹⁸ *Elements of Ethics*, p. 24.

¹⁹ *Comte, Mill and Spencer*, p. 230.

realized will, that is, the developed self; "the satisfaction of desires according to law," that is, the universal element which reflection reveals. Morality has been ever realizing itself in the world—this is the conception of Hegel. The rational is in some sense the real. Instead of following Kant's dualism of the abstract universal law or Imperative and the actual world, Hegel maintains that the moral law has become incarnated in the ethical life of humanity. "The Word has become flesh and dwells among us." The City of God must be found in the everlasting Real. The state so far is not completely rational, it is true; yet the ideal, the completely rational, must be realized in part. It may be far from "the parliament of man" and "the federation of the world;" yet this can come, according to Hegel, only by transforming, not supplanting, that which already exists—the further spiritualization of what we already possess. Human institutions are thus, in Schleiermacher's phrase, "an ethical heritage;" and man's education is simply a growing conformity of his reason—of his conscience—with the reason—the conscience of his environment. His environment is the concrete realization by humanity of its idea of the good.

"The consciousness of a social good, which is at the same time the true good of the individual, a consciousness which is implied even in savage life, is the moving principle in the whole evolution of morality. What holds human beings together in society is this idea of a good higher than merely individual good. Every form of social organization rests upon this tacit recognition of a higher good that is realized in the union of oneself with others. Suppose this entirely absent, and the moral consciousness would be impossible. For the moral consciousness always involves the recognition of a higher than individual good, and, because this higher good is partially realized in social laws and institutions, the

individual feels himself constrained by his reason to submit to it. It is by reflection upon this good, as realized in outward laws and institutions, that the individual becomes conscious of moral law. At first, law seems to be externally imposed, but the individual in reflecting upon it recognizes that the real force of the law lies in the fact that it is an expression of his higher self. It is true that in awakening to the consciousness of moral law as deriving its authority from reason, the individual at first asserts that custom and external law have no authority over him; that the sole authority he can rationally obey is the law of his own reason. But this is only one side of the truth; the other side is, that in custom and law there already is realized the law of reason. No doubt, society at any time is only a partial realization of the law of reason, and, therefore, no form of society is final; but it is none the less true that only in so far as morality realizes itself in society can it be realized at all."²⁰ Perhaps no better summary of Hegel's ethical doctrine can be given than in these words of Prof. Watson, which of course are used by him in another connection.

In a previous chapter it was found that the Absolute for Hegel is the Eternal Spirit thinking itself in nature and history. This is the metaphysics which Hegel furnishes us of man's ethical life. Here also we have his theory of obligation. With Kant the Categorical Imperative was essentially subjective. With Hegel, there can be no abstract self-realization. Apart from environment, capacity must be merely an abstraction. No man's morality and religion arise altogether in the bosom of his own being. The antennæ of the individual soul respond to the moral and religious notions of the spiritual community into which it is born. Thus the state in all its fullness of relations exists for the realization of the human spirit—this is the essence of Hegel's ethical

²⁰ Comte, Mill and Spencer, pp. 229, 230.

teaching. Ethical man, is man as realized in human institutions. Man is free simply because he cannot do what he likes.

§ 33. Hegel treats the subject of ethics under the three great divisions: (1) Abstract Right; (2) Morality and (3) what he calls *Sittlichkeit*, the integration of the other two. We may designate them (1) *Abstract Right—Law*; (2) *Abstract Duty—Morality*; (3) *The Ethical Life*. One is not necessarily earlier in time than the others. In reality, they are members of one concrete whole—the ethical life of an individual. There is also, however, an historical justification for Hegel's treatment. Before the time of Socrates it may be said that the moral life was that of the law-obeying citizen. With Socrates came the transition from abstract law to subjective morality; and with Christianity came the integration of the two preceding phases. "It was only after Christianity that the individual, and not isolatedly, but in connection with the whole community, came to know the full import of what is named moral experience. Christianity it was that wrought as a purifying ferment in the souls of men, abasing all the greeds of sense, shaming the lusts and prides and vanities of self, awakening repentance, chastening the heart, and leading the soul generally into candor, and simplicity, and humility, and love."²¹ The historical process is repeated in the individual life. It is obedience to an external law at first (abstract Right); with reflection comes the storm and stress; awakening reason asserts that "custom and external law have no authority over the individual; he must obey only his own reason, conscience." Gradually the other side of the truth comes into view, "that in custom and law there already is realized the law of reason." Each stage becomes more concrete than the preceding; and this is the ethical life whose whole nature is permeated by the life and spiritual atmosphere of his country.

²¹ Stirling, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Law*, p. 34.

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CHAPTER VI

LAW

Abstract Right

§ 34. The sphere for the realization of man's free will Hegel designates "Objective Mind." It is the sphere of man's devotion to the common good. The province of Law or Right is the first stage in the evolution of personality. In the first instance the term, of course, must be taken in a comprehensive sense—not as laws consciously imposed by a law-giver—nor yet in the sense of moral right; but merely in the sense of uniformity and equality, as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom; *i. e.*, "of laws, or rights, which express definite and stereotyped modes of behaviour."¹ A right can be constituted only by the action of a free substantial will. Abstract right or Law forms the foundation merely for the more living morality to be built upon it.

§ 35. It follows at once from Hegel's general conception that he could make no distinction between natural and positive rights. The fundamental law of rights, according to Hegel, is, "Be a person, and respect others as persons."² "By the absolute rights of individuals we mean those which are so in their primary and strictest sense, such as would belong to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it."³ "The phrase 'Law of Nature,' or Natural Right," says

¹ Wallace, *Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, p. clxxxix.

² *Werke* VIII, *Philosophie des Rechts*, § 36 (translated by Sterrett).

³ Blackstone, *Commentaries*, i, 123.

Hegel, "in use for the philosophy of law, involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing ready-formed in nature, or right as governed by the nature of things, *i. e.*, by the notion. The former used to be the common meaning, accompanied with the fiction of a *state of nature*, in which the law of nature should hold sway; whereas the social and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. The real fact is that the whole law and its every article are based on free personality alone—on self-determination or autonomy, which is the very contrary of determination by nature. The law of nature—strictly so-called—is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the reign of force, and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. The social state, on the other hand, is the condition in which alone right has its actuality; what is to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the state of nature."⁴

§ 36. Thus for Hegel the subject of rights is the person. But the person who is the subject of abstract right is not the person as developed in intellectual and ethical relations. It is primarily, as it were, the person in an excluding relation to others, and who represents the first phase of realizing will—in whom no humaneness is present, with no positive duties, but on whom commands are laid, and who is capable of entering into any of the relations presented to him in his environment. A person, conceived in this abstract way, does not exist, since to be real, *i. e.*, constituted a person, it must be given some measure of objective reality. It is through the will, which, as has been indicated above, is the constitutive element of the person, that there is given to the person the embodiment necessary to its completeness. It is

⁴ *Werke*, VII, § 502 (*The Philosophy of Mind*, Wallace's Translation).

through the activity of the will, then, that the world of nature is posited as belonging to the person. The sphere of abstract right or law will thus include whatever is appropriated by the act of will. Hegel distinguishes three forms of this externalization of the will:

(a) Property is the primary form in which personality as self-relating free-will renders itself objectively real.

(b) Contract involves a common will and the maintenance of rights through the union of two or more wills respecting the institution and transference of property.

(c) Injustice and crime—the sphere of the particular will in opposition to itself as absolute or universal will.

§ 37. "There is nothing," says Blackstone, "which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property, or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. And yet, there are very few that will give themselves the trouble to consider the original and foundation of this right. . . . These enquiries, it must be owned, would be useless and even troublesome in common life. It is well if the mass of mankind will obey the laws when made, without scrutinizing too nicely into the reason of making them."

In the discussions over economic problems at the present time, the questions involved in the theory of property are perhaps the most disturbing. The difficulties of the political order which have for so long threatened to correct, or rather to annihilate the institutions of the past have, in part at least, been replaced by the still graver difficulties of the social order. The equality of political with the inequality of social conditions is the problem with which the present generation has to deal. We are told by Mr. Henry George and others that all property is the result of labor; yet their name

is legion who labor and who possess no property; and there is perhaps an increasing number who, while ignorant of what labor means, nevertheless live a life of ease and luxury. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that property is becoming more and more concentrated, and the contrast between the rich and the poor more and more accentuated. "At Rome, as in Greece," says Laveleye, "inequality, after stifling liberty, destroyed the state itself."⁵

The idea of property is a primary and fundamental one, and underlies most of our social and economic difficulties. It would thus seem to be something inherent in the very nature of man. It has been variously discussed by the philosopher, the economist, and the social reformer. In the notion "right of property" there are two elements to be taken into account by any theory attempting an explanation of the nature and origin of property. There is the individual and the social element. Property is a creation of some form of society, whether the society consists in the horde, clan, tribe, or civilized nation. Man, in so far as he is a property-holder, is a member of some form of social group. "We at length know something," says Maine, "concerning the beginnings of the great institution of property in land. The collective ownership of the soil by groups of men either in fact united by blood relationship, or believing or assuming that they are so united, is now entitled to rank as an ascertained primitive phenomenon, once universally characterizing those communities of mankind between whose civilization and our own there is any distinct connection or analogy."⁶ And Lafargue writes: "Mankind underwent a long and painful process of development before arriving at private property in land."⁷

⁵ *Primitive Property* (translated by Marriott). Preface to original edition, p. xxx.

⁶ *Early History of Institutions*, p. 1-2.

⁷ *Evolution of Property*, p. 35.

Merely to trace the changing phases of any reality does not in itself explain the reality. "Evolution is not a force, but a process; not a cause, but a law."⁸ The mode in which property has been appropriated, as well as the objects appropriated, may vary at different times and in different societies. Doubtless in the initial stages of social progress the notion of property existed merely in an indistinct, yet real sense of unity and consequent feeling of co-ownership by the individuals composing the horde, family, clan or tribe. In the early nomadic life, co-ownership would be felt in whatever articles were carried from place to place. When the tribe came to possess a settled abode (occasioned by growth in numbers or through the appearance of other tribes) landed property began to develop into the various forms of tribal ownership so adequately traced by Maine, Laveleye and Lafargue.

Roman jurisprudence, on which our modern jurisprudence is professedly based, founds the right of property principally on the fact of occupancy of a *res nullius*. According to this theory the possession of a particular object or piece of ground would be co-extensive with the power to retain it. The right of appropriation would simply be the right of the strongest.

Hobbes' theory of property follows as a direct consequence from his theory of the state. There is no right of property as against the sovereign power. In insisting on the importance of the individual, though he makes it too severely prominent, Hobbes did good service for the future. Locke, with individualism still as his starting-point, accepts the notion of a contract or convention, but finds the foundation of property in labor. It is my labor bestowed on objects which makes them my property. The chief end of civil society is the preservation of the property so constituted.⁹

⁸ Morley, *On Compromise*, p. 210.

⁹ *Toleration*, (Works, II).

In making labor the principle of the right of property, Locke pointed out the element which the general mind recognizes as constitutive of that right. Yet here a difficulty is raised, namely, why is it that possession is not always held by labor, and why does the laborer not always possess property? The right of labor, moreover, presupposes that the use of the materials has been conceded. Society must have some share in every product of labor. The difficulty, however, must not obscure the element of truth in Locke's view. The view itself represents the distinctively British or economic standpoint regarding the right of property.

The result of German discussion was to direct attention to the ideal or personal side of property, in contrast to its purely material value. Kant regarded it as one of the inalienable rights of personality, and thus invested it with a distinctly moral character. Kant and Fichte, however, regard the state merely as an institution which by physical power lends sanction to the law. For Fichte the ultimate foundation of property is in an act of will to which bodily action has given effect. He believed the time was coming when "property will lose its exclusively private character and become a social institution." In general, it may be said that the English view the right in its objective, utilitarian or economic aspect; whereas the Germans lay the emphasis rather on the subjective requirements of personality. It would seem that an adequate theory would combine the subjective and objective points of view. As Prof. Newcomb says: "The respect for property is greater to-day because the right is more rationally defined and exercised."¹⁰

Almost invariably in theories of property two questions are confused, which, in an analytic discussion of the problem, should be kept separate. Not that process can in any stage be separated from the product, yet for purposes of examin-

¹⁰ *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I.

ation an ideal separation must be made. (1) There is first the historical question, In what way, as a matter of fact, have men appropriated property? This side has perhaps been given an undue emphasis in modern times through the prevailing influence of the historical method of enquiry. (2) Granting, in the second place, the appropriation, how has the notion of right come to be associated with it? "Why it was," says Maine, "that lapse of time created a sentiment of respect for his possession—which is the exact source of the universal reverence of mankind for that which has for a long period *de facto* existed—are questions really deserving the profoundest examination, but lying far beyond the boundary of our present enquiries."¹¹ But it is just the answer to this question which is fundamental to any theory of the "right" of property.

The notion "right of property" involves at least (1) the idea of permanence, and (2) that the property-holder is secured in his right so long as he wills to keep it. There is thus involved in the right an individual and a social element. Property as an institution is contemporaneous with society, and Laveleye appears to take an extreme position when he asserts that "at the present day property has been deprived of all social character. . . . It is a privilege subject to no fetters, no reservation, and no obligation, which seems to have no other end than the well-being of the individual." (1) There is first the individual element, and this is founded in the will of the person. The individual has an idea of a self-satisfaction, of a good to be realized; and appropriation is its expression. Appropriation as the expression of will is thus the initial condition of the existence of property. It is not, however, the whole process. If it were, the lower animals could be said to have the proprietary sentiment. The question rather is, Why is it that other

¹¹ *Ancient Law*, p. 248.

individuals possessed of similar needs and desires leave the appropriating individual in undisturbed possession? The social element must in some way be accounted for. (2) "Man is by nature a political animal," says Aristotle. Property is a social institution in primitive as well as in modern times. In the appropriation by the individual there is involved the social element, namely, the recognition by the individual of the right of appropriation as belonging to other individuals, and the recognition by the latter of a similar right of the individual to the appropriated objects as the permanent medium for the expression of his wants and desires. Thus, in reality, in the right to labor is pre-supposed the right to certain materials. Without a universal element in the individual mind, social union is inconceivable. If the individual is to be conceived atomistically, to speak of a "right of property" is unintelligible. "Where there is no recognition of a common good there can be no right in any other sense than power."¹² The ground of property can only lie in the recognition by the members of any social group of a common good; a good, recognized, it may be, dimly, yet which is in some way immanent and operative in the minds of the individuals composing a horde, family, clan, tribe, society or state; and only on this basis—if we are to mean anything by the word—can we speak of a right of property, or indeed of a right or duty of any kind.

§ 38. Since it is chiefly Hegel's view of property which has been embodied in the preceding section, a summary of his doctrine will be sufficient. (1) For the development of man's free personality some instrument is required. "It is necessary," says Hegel, "to find some external sphere for his freedom." In the psychology was briefly traced the process by which the spirit gradually takes possession of the body—informs it. So now, mind is to take possession of

¹² Green, *Principles of Political Obligation, Works*, Vol. ii, p. 370.

nature and make it also instrumental. Appropriation as an act of will is the primary stage in man's self-realization. Occupation is, accordingly, an incident rather than the basis of property. The thing is *mine* because I put my will into it. Property is thus, primarily, realized will. But this needs qualification. (2) As was noted above, Hegel maintains that personality is the foundation of all rights. Right and duty are thus *correlata*: what is a right is also a duty, and what is a duty is also a right. Here then, for Hegel, there comes in the social element in property. The rationality of property does not lie in its satisfaction of wants, that is, of the merely individual or empirical will, but in its abrogation of the mere subjectivity of personality. It is in property that the person primarily exists as reason. It is the effort on the part of the individual to give reality to a universal—a good. "The good is the universal of will." It is a good which the individual recognizes to be common to himself with others. As a *rational* being man recognizes the universal in particular wants and desires. Property is accordingly the first stage in man's development as a rational or moral being.

Hegel traces the notion of property through the three stages. (1) The first the immediate taking *possession* of a thing; (2) The fuller consciousness of the difference between the person and the thing in the transformation of the latter through *use* or *consumption*; (3) The voluntary *relinquishment* is a still fuller sort of ownership.

§ 39. The relinquishment of property leads naturally to the subject of contracts. In ownership the will of the individual enters the circle of the common will; were there only a single proprietor the property relation could not be developed. The relation of one property to another is the relation of will to will. "Mine" is the correlative of "thine;" and this relation exists because we admit the existence of a

common will which we are ready to obey. Property really becomes mine when recognized as such by another. This recognition is the essential principle in contract. In it the notion of a common will is beginning to take visible shape. The will of contract, as distinguished from the universal will which has its foundation in the essential nature of man as a rational being, and which, if realized, would result in absolute justice, is particular and accidental. The universal will must, of course, find its realization in and through the particular will. But in the particular will on which contract is based there is no assurance of its conformity with the universal, nor of the inner motive of those to whom is owing its existence. This common will of the individuals in a contract of necessity sooner or later conflicts with the true, universal will. Such collision constitutes wrong. The wrong in question may of course be unconscious or *unintentional*. *Fraud* is conscious wrong; it respects the form but disregards the substance of right. Wrong as *crime* is where neither the form nor substance of right is regarded. Crime is opposed to right as right, inasmuch as it is an attack on freedom in its universal sense. Crime as such has, of course, no external existence—no more than right. Revenge, which is often resorted to, and in which punishment in its earliest stages undoubtedly consisted, is merely the assertion once more of right of the subjective will. Inasmuch, however, as crime is an internal, not an external, condition, a condition of the will rather than an act resulting therefrom, it follows that any annulling of this phase of the particular will can only come from regarding punishment as but the completion of the act undertaken by the subjective will in its assertion of a right which is at variance with the common will. In the criminal himself must lie the universal that is to do him justice. It is in this fact that punishment has its justification; and on this all rational theories of punishment must ultimately be based.

§ 40. This leads us to see what is Hegel's conception of the true meaning of punishment. To use his own words, "punishment is not foreign constraint to which the criminal is subjected, but the manifestation of his own act." Crime is not simply an evil, but is the action of a person and a violation of right as such. It is in this fact that the justification of punishment, both from the point of view of the criminal and of society, is to be found. His punishment is in reality the right of the criminal as a free, self-determining agent; it is the natural expression of his action. This is consistent with Hegel's theory of right and duty, namely, that there can be no such thing as abstract self-realization: rights and duties are meaningless to an individual irrespective of society. "Only, if we grant that without society men cannot realize their true self, can it be maintained that no one is justified in separating himself from society. But if society is necessary to constitute a right, as distinguished from a mere object of desire, it cannot be said that society is an accidental relation into which men may or may not enter; it is a relation into which they *must* enter by the very law of their reason. I have rights only as a member of society, not as a separate individual."¹³

"Punishment," says Hegel, "is really a right to the criminal himself." To the question, then, so often discussed, whether punishment in its proper nature is to be regarded as preventive, retributive or reformatory, Hegel would answer that it is in reality all three. For Hegel man's good is a social good; and punishment is preventive in so far as it tends to remove hindrances to social unity which have been caused by individual caprice. It is educative, also, as the positive aspect of prevention—in that it creates in the members of a society the consciousness that punishment is the just and natural outcome of the criminal act. Punish-

¹³ Watson, *Comte, Mill and Spencer*, p. 268.

ment, again, is retributive. Not in the sense of revenge, however, which is only a new violation; the deed of a mere subjective arbitrary will—pre-social vengeance. It is retributive in the sense of expressing public indignation at wrong-doing. As Green says, "this indignation is inseparable from the interest in social well-being, and along with it the chief agent in the establishment and maintenance of legal punishment."¹⁴

§ 41. The right of punishment—as the right of property—is for Hegel based on the moral nature of man. Property, contract, wrong, are stages in the process by which the individual is led to reflect on his own nature—driven back into himself. Thus it is in his relation to other individuals that man is gradually led to reflect upon and understand his own moral nature. So that the machinery of law is but instrumental in bringing man to know himself. It is simply because law and custom are the expression of the moral life of the social organism that the individual member in time becomes conscious of his own moral and spiritual nature. Law compelled him to respect the rights of others—whatever his subjective will or inclination might have been. But it cannot be said that such an act is moral on the part of the individual. Does the respect for the rights of others spring from a dictate of reason? When the individual puts this question to himself he has entered the moral sphere. *Morality is personal*—this is the next stage in the life of the individual. "This," says Hegel, "is the sphere of reflective thought, the internal forum of *conscience*."¹⁵ Thus we come to Hegel's second stage in the treatment of objective mind—of morality or the moral life.

¹⁴ *Works II., Political Obligation*, § 183.

¹⁵ *Philosophie des Rechts*, (Sterrett's Translation) § 104.

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CHAPTER VII

THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE

§ 42. It was Socrates who said that "an unexamined life is not one that should be led by man." In the preceding chapter was given an outline of Hegel's first division of "objective mind," namely, the sphere of law or right, where life consisted in conformity to existing law. The person had not arrived at that stage of morality in which he could regard the various laws and customs he obeyed as the very medium through which his self-realization is to be attained. His conformity to the laws, it may be, was the result of compulsion rather than of a spiritual assimilation of their import. This represents the stage of enforced obedience in the life of the individual—an abstract phase, and, inasmuch as the obedience is not freely chosen by the individual, a non-moral phase. Environment, as the expression of morality, moralizes the individual and gives him whatever conscience he has. The environment of human relations is thus, as Prof. Dewey remarks, to conscience what the external world of experience is to consciousness. The individual has to put meaning into both, and thereby come to understand and realize his own inner life.

The second division—of conscience—deals with the other side of the relation—the individual subject which environment gradually awakens to a sense of moral values. In conforming to the life of the family, of society, and of the state, the individual in reality lives over the life of his people and of the human race, and thus gradually rises to conscious

participation in a common good which is being realized in the lives of men. From the fact that law or right is treated before morality it would seem that Hegel regarded law as the basis of morality, rather than morality as the basis of law. As will be seen later, the phases law and duty are both abstract, and the truly ethical life results from an integration of the two. As to the question whether law precedes morality or the reverse, there can be little doubt that the notion of right or law enters more into social relations, and furnishes the general standard for society in its judgment of action. For the majority of individuals their morality appears as the result of laws externally enforced, rather than of the living self-unfolding of the spiritual nature. The concrete act is the unit of morality or conduct; and the act, to be moral, is for the individual who has adopted it as the medium of his self-expression, his good. In reality, then, law and morality are evolved together, and their separation, save for purposes of examination, creates a false antithesis. This, then, is Hegel's meaning. Morality, the identification by the individual of his good with the common or universal good, is the principle of cohesion in every form of association from the most primitive horde to the various social institutions—the family, the church, the state—of modern civilization. "Pure individualism would mean social dissolution."¹

§ 43. Society is thus for Hegel an expression of morality. The "moral" in reality includes the entire active life of man. The end of life is self-expression and self-development through activity. So that our every action contributes to the self-unfolding of the personal life. For Hegel, as he says, the moral signifies volitional mode, so far as it is in the interior of the will in general.² It is the subjective aspect of

¹ D'Arcy, *Short Study of Ethics*, p. 195.

² *Werke*, VII., § 503 (*The Philosophy of Mind*, translated by Wallace).

conformity to the laws and institutions in which the ethical principle, at work in the life of humanity, has embodied itself; it thus includes the "purpose" and "intention" of the individual.

In the sphere of abstract right the will of the person found its realization in objective action; in "morality" freedom becomes the conscious possession of the subject. The will finds its freedom in the internal rather than in the external. The supreme aim of the will in its subjective character, as Hegel says, is that laws and precepts shall have their recognition and justification in the heart and conscience of the subject. It is this internal freedom that stamps their value on actions and makes the subject responsible for his deeds. From the moral standpoint man is judged according to his own self-determination. He is responsible, according to Hegel, for such changes wrought in his environment as were consciously included in his purpose. Are actions, then, to be the subject of moral approval or disapproval, (1) solely from their consequences, or (2) is merely the inner side of the action, irrespective of consequences, to be taken into account? This, according to Hegel, is a false antithesis. It is in the motive of the self-determining subject that the morality of an action is to be found. The motive has both a subjective and objective reference. For Hegel, as has been seen, the primary and fundamental ethical conception is, the good. It is in the action—the end—that the satisfaction of the self is attained. The self cannot be separated from the object, but is the immanent life of the activity; the activity is the end, and it is to this that morality appertains. The motive is the determining soul of action.

§ 44. "The Good," says Hegel, "is the *Idea*, as the unity of the *concept* of the will and of the particular will. It is realized freedom, the absolute final purpose of the world. In this unity, abstract right, as well as *well-being*, and the

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subjectivity of knowledge are annulled as independent in themselves, but at the same time are contained and preserved in it as to their essence."³ The harmony of the particular and universal will is the good. Conscience is simply the mind acting in a certain direction—specifying in what the good consists. For Hegel the right is not good without well-being, and well-being is not good without right. Since the good so far exists as a universal not brought into harmony with the particular modes of the individual's action, it imposes on the individual will an inviolable ideal of duty. It was this standpoint which Kant regarded as the highest. The difficulty involved in Kant's doctrine of duty has been outlined in a preceding chapter. As Hegel says, "It is the merit of the lofty standpoint of Kant's philosophy to have emphasized the significance of duty. Yet every action demands some definite content and aim. Abstract duty does not contain such, consequently, the question arises, *what* is duty?"⁴

"It is Hegel," says Prof. Seth, "who, of all modern philosophers, has given most adequate expression to the essential principle of the ethical life, alike on its negative and on its positive side. With Kant he recognizes the full claim of reason, but he insists upon correlating with it the rightful claim of sensibility. In ethics, as in metaphysics, Hegel finds the universal in the particular, the rational in the sensible. In the evolution of the moral, as of the intellectual life, he discovers the dialectical movement of affirmation through negation, of life through death; in the one as in the other phase of human experience, 'that is first which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual.' The life of natural sensibility is only the raw material of the moral life."⁵

³ *Werke*, VIII, § 129 (*Philosophie des Rechts*, Sterrett's Translation).

⁴ *Werke*, VII, §§ 133-4 (*Philosophie des Rechts*, Sterrett's Translation).

⁵ *A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 227.

In the preceding chapters we have tried to indicate how Hegel was in reality the first to penetrate beneath dualism in all its forms; and this is especially apparent in his ethical system. Previous to the time of Hegel, ethical theories were founded on a dualistic, or, as Prof. Seth says, "a half view of human nature." The highest life, according to Plato and Aristotle, was the life of contemplation. The theories of the Cynics and the Cyrenaics were one-sided—a one-sidedness aggravated by the Stoic and the Epicurean systems. The asceticism of the Middle Ages needs only to be mentioned—an asceticism which hung like a body of death to the system of Kant. For Hegel, however, the life of natural sensibility must be the "raw material," but only the raw material of the moral life. It is for the practical reason to direct and control; and man in being self-conscious can determine himself through the chaos of sensations and desires into a free intelligence and will. The developed man is he whose natural inclinations and desires are purged by the alchemy of a consistent purpose, which in turn imparts to his various activities their peculiar significance and value. The ethical life is the self-unfolding of the whole personality.

§ 45. The *genuine* conscience, says Hegel, is the mind wishing for that only which is absolutely good. Conscience is the reflection of man into himself; it is self-communion. But for Hegel morality is not yet "ethicity," the organic unity of the good and conscience, of the universal and the individual. From the formal standpoint of morality, conscience lacks all such objective content. "It is merely the infinite formal certitude of itself—of the subjective individual. It expresses the absolute right of the subjective self-consciousness to know just what the right and obligatory are."⁶ This is the more subjective consciousness with its demand, "duty for duty's sake." It insists on maintaining only its

⁶ *Werke*, VIII, *Philosophie des Rechts*, § 137 (Sterrett's Translation).

inner convictions; and, if permitted to go on, would really dissolve all definite forms of right and duty. But Hegel, as will be apparent, is far from denying the right of private judgment. The good as objective and universal must find its realization through the self-determining activity of individual subjects. "We may grant," says Hegel, "that no current form of morality is absolutely true and final. When any current form has become insufficient or obsolete, it is the prerogative of subjectivity to evolve another. In truth, every existing form of ethicality (concrete social morality) has been produced through this subjective activity of the social spirit."⁷

§ 46. The Good or Duty must be universal and objective as well, and the medium of its expression can only be the self-determining activity of the individual subject. "And the true conscience cannot be merely subjective and indeterminate consciousness of an abstractly universal power and right of self-determination." "The individual," says Schurman, "has not to create from his own innate emptiness some new morality; in the main, he has only to make his own the morality of his people and his country."⁸ The integration of the Good and subjective will forms the third phase of "Objective Mind"—the ethical life. Yet law and morality are not set aside: they are transformed into the concrete moral life of man as it is unfolded in a social community. "Both right and morality need the *ethical* for their foundation, as without it neither has any actuality. Only the *Idea*, the true infinite, is actual. Rights exist only as the branch, or as a plant clinging round a firm tree."⁹

⁷ *Werke*, VIII, *Philosophie des Rechts*, § 138 (Sterrett's Translation).

⁸ *Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution*, p. 66.

⁹ *Werke*, VIII, *Philosophie des Rechts* (Sterrett's Translation).

CHAPTER VIII

THE ETHICAL LIFE

Life is one: the individual and society are its two necessary manifestations; life considered singly, and life in relation to others. Flames kindled upon a common altar, they approach each other in rising, until they mingle together in God.

MAZZINI.

§ 47. The ethical world of concrete social life (*Sittlichkeit*) which forms the third division of Hegel's treatment of "objective" mind, is the integration of the two preceding stages, the legal or objective freedom, and of abstract subjectivity, asserting the right of private judgment. In this stage man's self-consciousness becomes the ethical or spiritual consciousness, and his will, the will of the spirit. The individual life becomes an expression of the spiritual life of its environment. No longer does the individual subject render an enforced submission to the laws and institutions as something foreign to his nature: rather, as Hegel says, these afford to him the "testimony of the spirit as being of its own essence."¹ Freedom is the full-blown flower of spirit. In the ethical life of organized human and spiritual relations, this ideal of freedom is gradually unfolded in the minds and hearts of men; who come to learn that their highest good is bound up with the good of others. The freedom of the will is for Hegel the expression of the entire personality, as the individual is the expression of society. On the fidelity with which the individual performs his function depends the life of the social organism: and in turn, it is the existence

¹ *Werke*, VIII, § 147.

of the social organism which enables the individual to fulfil his capacities. "In ceasing to contend for his rights against others, he has made all their rights his own. The sacrifice of selfishness is the birth of the true self. The universal, which seemed to swallow up the individual life, for the first time gives it possession of the good for which it exists."²

§ 48. The individual in becoming conscious of the various relations existing in the community in which he is a vital and organic member, recognizes their fulfilment as duties which are binding on his will. The world of man's duty is the actual world. "There is nothing else for him to do," says Hegel, "than that which is prescribed, proclaimed and made known to him in his ethical relations."³ As man grows into true freedom, the fulfilment of these duties will more and more wear the aspect of necessity: for with Hegel, freedom is the freedom of necessity. Man's freedom is through obedience; not that duty, however, can ever be a limitation. "Obligatory duty can appear as a limitation only to undetermined subjectivity or abstract freedom, and to the desires of the natural will, or to that moral will which determines its indeterminate good through its own caprice."⁴ In fulfilling his duty the individual man finds his liberation from the unsatisfying isolation of his natural self. "It is when the moral life of society flows into me that my nature reaches a fuller development; and then only are my social duties adequately fulfilled when they cease to have the aspect of an outward law and pass, in love and self-devotion, into the spontaneity of a second nature."⁵

Virtue for Hegel is ethical personality: it is the ethical spirit in so far as it is embodied in the life of the individual.

² Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 155.

³ *Werke*, VIII, § 150 (*Philosophie des Rechts*, Sterrett's Translation.)

⁴ *Werke*, VIII, § 149 (*Philosophie des Rechts*, Sterrett's Translation.)

⁵ Principal Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 265.

"We are suckled at the breast of the environing ethos," says Hegel. The individual is what he is in so far as he has responded to the moulding influences of his "spiritual setting." That man is virtuous who manifests the ethical as an abiding element in his character. As with Aristotle, virtue is a habit: the ethical spirit becomes a second nature; the living and informing soul of every action. Education, then, in its broadest and truest sense, is "the art of making men ethical: it considers man as a merely natural being—it shows the way to a new birth, how to convert his first nature into a second spiritual nature, so that this spiritual becomes a *habit* in him." The man, however, who is to remain alive spiritually must not allow his subjective consciousness to become dim through a spirit-deadening conformity to *mere* habit, nor his soul to cease its response to the ravishing ideal. He must ever be mindful of the truth expressed in Lowell's words:

"New occasions teach new duties;
Time makes ancient good uncouth."

In other words, only as it is progressive can the soul of man have moral and spiritual healthfulness. A man's conscience is continually reacting on its environment. The conscience of individuals is the absolute *form*, as Hegel says, the existing actuality, the ethical life of the community. If there exists a bond of union in the state it must issue from the inner life of the individual members. It cannot come from without. And, as Prof. Dewey states it, "the moral endeavor of man takes the form not of isolated fancies about right and wrong, nor of attempts to frame a morality for himself, nor of efforts to bring into being some praiseworthy ideal never realized, but the form of sustaining and furthering the moral world of which he is a member." The work of the individual is a work for others, and is rendered possible only

through the work of others. Man as an individual thus lives through the universal; seeing in the universal his outward existence, which is gradually reproduced in his own conscious experience and in that of his fellow-citizens. Thus, also, his every action, even the commonest, is transformed in the light of its spiritual worth and given its significance in the gradual unfolding in the hearts and lives of men of that power "which makes for righteousness." For Hegel, ethical atomism is inconceivable. Man is an intelligent and moral personality because, as individual, he is a partaker of the life of Universal Reason—a sharer in that Divine life which gradually "reproduces itself in the human soul."⁶

§ 49. Hegel traces the development of the person to completed freedom through three stages:

(1) The family; which is the primary nucleus of all human union and fellowship.

(2) The civic community; the union of independent individuals in a formal universality for the security of private and common interests.

(3) The state; which is the self-conscious substance, or the invisible spirit of the nation developed to an organic actuality in the hearts and customs and genius of the people.

§ 50. The family is the primary union of mankind. "The spirit," says Hegel, "finds itself bound to another, and in this tie feels the assurance of its own existence." Love, which is its foundation, its organizing and controlling principle, is the consciousness of our unity with another. It contains first of all a feeling of dependence; and in my union with another I am made that which I feel my true nature bids me become. "The family," says Mackenzie, "is like a burning-glass which concentrates human sympathies on a point. Within that narrow circle selfishness is gradually overcome and wider interests developed. The family ena-

⁶ Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 180.

bles a few persons to become not merely objects for each other, but parts of a single life; and the unity thus effected may then be very readily extended as sympathies grow."⁷ The family has ever been the first instrument of man's social education—of his moralization. As sensation is the first element in the growth of his intellectual world, so love is the first in humane self-knowledge.

Hegel considers the family relation in three of its aspects: (1) marriage, (2) family property, (3) the education of the children and the dissolution of the family.

The family is based upon marriage. Hegel conceives the question of marriage to lie at the very foundation of the life of a state. "The greatest and deepest of all human controversies," says Gladstone, "is the marriage controversy. It appears to be surging up on all sides around us." The history of human marriage may be traced back to forms which differ little from the life of the animals. Merely to trace it back to its lowly beginning, however; to regard it as merely a natural institution, is to lose sight of the higher purposes which, at present, we are accustomed to associate with it. "Marriage has been subject to evolution in various ways," writes Westermarck, "though the course of evolution has not always been the same. The dominant tendency has been the extension of the wife's rights. A wife is no longer the husband's property; and according to modern ideas, marriage is, or should be, a contract on the footing of perfect equality between the sexes. The history of human marriage is the history of a relation in which women have been gradually triumphing over the passions, prejudices and selfish interests of men."⁸ Yet in every phase of human evolution the question of interest is, "what has been evolved," and "to what end is the evolution directed?"

⁷ *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, pp. 363-4.

⁸ *History of Human Marriage*, pp. 549-550.











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For Hegel marriage is essentially an ethical or spiritual relation. It is not to be regarded as an ordinary mutual contract; for, in reality, it is an agreement to pass beyond that sphere. The objective point of its inception is the free consent of the persons concerned to give up their independent personality and find their true and higher personality in each other—"the two-cell'd heart beating, with one full stroke, life." The subjective feeling is not, for Hegel, the only one of importance. "It is a further abstraction," he says, "when the divine, the substantial in this phase of sentiment is separated from its proper sexual side, and from the feeling and the consciousness of spiritual unity, and falsely given a separate existence as *Platonic love*."⁹ Abstraction finds no place in Hegel's system. The natural self must be the organ of the spiritual life. "Our life is one, because our nature is one."¹⁰ "The new life which rises out of the marriage union, and of which the merely animal nature is incapable, reacts on the crude material out of which it emerges. Love and self-surrender transfigure appetite into a spiritual affection, and purge it of its baseness."¹¹ Hegel's entire doctrine of ethics is informed by the idea that the spirit must realize its capacities, not by withdrawal from the natural, but by transforming the natural into a spiritual setting for its higher purposes. "From flesh unto spirit man grows," says Browning; and Matthew Arnold—

"Know man hath all which Nature hath, but more,
And in that *more* lies all his hopes of good."¹²

The absolute prerequisite of marriage, then, according to Hegel, is reciprocal love. Bassanio found the image of Por-

⁹ *Werke* VIII., § 162 (*Philosophie des Rechts*, Sterrett's Translation).

¹⁰ Seth, *A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 219.

¹¹ Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 275.

¹² Quoted by Prof. Seth, *loc. cit.*

tia imprinted on his heart. Both found their harmonious existence in the other. Shakespeare doubtless intended theirs as the "marriage of true minds," and Belmont as the land of harmony and love. According to Hegel the marriage ceremony should be sacredly solemnized as the visible expression of a spiritual relation. His entire conception is based on the worth of personality. Anything, therefore, which indicates that either party is used as a means rather than as an end, destroys the truth of the relation. Property acquires also an ethical interest when held in common. In the family possessions, however, the unity of the parents is in an external thing—but in the child, in which their love is incarnated, the unity is in a spiritual being. The marriage relation is completed in the natural and spiritual birth of the child. As Browning says, "'Tis in a child man and wife grow complete, one flesh." It is the duty of the parents to help the child in its self-unfolding, as a free spiritual being, to independent personality; this is its spiritual birth.

§ 51. The Civic Community stands between the family and the state, although its historical evolution may be subsequent to that of the state. It is the sphere of self-interest. Yet individualism is only possible on a social basis. Pushed to the extreme it is anarchy. Even in attaining the satisfaction of his wants the individual must enter into relation with others and so minister also to the attainment of their ends. Thus in the liberation from mere wants lies their social or universal aspect. "Particularity limited by universality is alone the measure through which every particular individual furthers his own welfare."¹³ Of the civic community Hegel notices the three phases: (1) the system of wants, (2) the administration of justice, (3) the police and municipal corporation. Wants are satisfied through labor. By the division of labor production and technical skill is in-

¹³ *Werke*, VIII, § 182 (*Philosophie des Rechts*, Sterrett's Translation).

creased; and each individual becomes more dependent on the social system. "It is Reason as immanent in the system of human wants and activities that articulates this system into an organic whole of different members."¹⁴

§ 52. The State for Hegel is the realization of the moral idea. "It is the spirit that dwells in the world and realizes itself in the world through consciousness. It is the course of God through the world that constitutes the state. Its ground is the power of Reason actualizing itself as will." In it the family and the civic community find their true expression. Reason must be to some extent at least the immanent and vitalizing principle of all existing states; just as every human being, however abnormal, reflects the ideal. The bond between states is the spirit of humanity which has been partially realized in the course of history. The spirit of humanity is the spirit of God as actual on earth. The ideal state is the harmony of the individual and the universal—the harmonious and complete realization of both elements.

Every phase of human life is for Hegel a product of growth, not of manufacture. Freedom is the self-unfolding of a person under the immanent law of reason. In a preceding chapter Hegel's conception of the development of consciousness was traced in outline. Consciousness was not simply the creation of an environment, nor yet was its existence apart from environment conceivable. Thought is an organic process. A godless world and a worldless God are both alike abstractions. Freedom is not the freedom of indifference, but the freedom of necessity, which regards the volition apart from the character as a pure abstraction. So also in Hegel's conception of society the individual apart from society simply does not exist. The conception of "natural rights" and of the "social contract" are alike ab-

¹⁴ *Werke*, VIII, § 200 (*Philosophie des Rechts*, Sterrett's Translation).

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stractions. Rights and duties belong to man only because "he is by nature a social being." The individualism of modern society received its practical refutation in the French Revolution. For Hegel, will, not force, is the basis of the state. Rights and duties, than which nothing in the state are more real, have their ultimate justification in self-consciousness.

The true view of society as an organism is that which regards the individual life as the social life. "The state being objective reason, or spirit, the individual himself has real human objectivity, true individuality, and a truly ethical quality only as he is a member of the State."¹⁵ It is, therefore, a mistake to emphasize the antithesis between the individual and social life. In one sense it is true that the individual can only realize his capacities by rising superior to environment. Yet, as Prof. Seth well says, "the individual and the social are in reality two aspects of the one undivided life of virtue, and their unity is discovered with their reduction to the common principle of Personality."¹⁶ According to Hegel, the state is not a mechanism; it is the rational life of self-conscious freedom; it is the order of the moral world. It is thus the moral order of individuals; the life of the state is, therefore, the life of individuals. In reality, as Prof. Seth remarks in the passage already mentioned, society is not an "organism," but the ethical organization of individuals. In living the social life, however, the individual must also find the satisfaction of his own interests. "In the right of the individual to seek his own welfare lies the possibility of his seeking the welfare of the social organism."¹⁷ Thus egoism and altruism, as theories, are both alike abstract. Morality is the realization of the person. But abstract self-realization

¹⁵ Morris, *Hegel, Philosophy of History*, p. 80.

¹⁶ *A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 284.

¹⁷ Prof. Henry Jones, *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, p. 200.

is inconceivable. As Prof. Royce says, "there is no merely inner self." There is no such thing as individual self-consciousness—nor individual self-realization.

From this standpoint there is no conflict between Individualism and Socialism. Progress in society can only mean progress in the individuals composing it. It is the fuller articulation of the rights and duties of the individual members in order to their freer self-development. The state is the medium of personal self-expression: this is its ethical basis. Personality is the ultimate fact. All rights and duties are the expression of persons; "State interference" may limit the individual; it cannot limit the person. The development of society, therefore, must be from within. In development an ideal is implied; and ideals can only originate in personality. "The life task of every individual," says Bluntschli, "is to develop his capacities and to manifest his essence. So, too, the duty of the state-person is to develop the latent powers of the nation, and to manifest its capacities."¹⁸ "The liberation of mind, in which it proceeds to come to itself and to realize its truth, and the business of so doing, is the supreme right, the absolute Law."¹⁹ The true freedom of the individual means, for Hegel, nothing but "determination by the absolute idea throughout." The civic and social institutions are the objective expression of man's freedom—of the moral ideal. The moral life is the state reflected in the heart of the individual member, while the state is the concrete body with which the moral life is clothed. Hegel, however, recognizes no finality in the moral life, nor in the ethical institutions in which it is embodied. It is not necessary to enter further into his conception of the state as a political organization. The moral life is the life of the good

¹⁸ *The Theory of the State*, p. 321 (*English translation*).

¹⁹ Hegel, *Werke*, VII, § 550 (*The Philosophy of Mind*, Wallace's Translation).

citizen—a life which is made up of civic and social relations; the fulfilment of which is man's highest duty. X

Religion is the basis of the moral life and of the state. For Hegel the real basis of social life, and even of intelligence, is religion. But, as Prof. Wallace says, "religion is a faith and a theory which gives unity to the facts of life, and gives it, not because the unity is in detail proved or detected, but because life and experience inexorably demand and evince such a unity to the heart. The religion of a time is not its nominal creed, but its dominant conviction of the meaning of reality, the principle which animates all its being and all its striving, the faith it has in the laws of nature and the purpose of life."²⁰

The will is the man. His ideal is self-realization or freedom; and self-realization is achieved through the individual's making the life of the world his own. The larger and fuller life of the spirit is gradually achieved in the unity of the family, of the civic community and of the state. In some individuals the spiritual life is expanded even to identification with the life of humanity; and this is all possible because the human spirit has its life in an infinite Spirit, which has been the immanent life of all human activity. To conclude with Principal Caird's words: "Every pulse-beat of its life is the expression and realization of the life of God."

§ 53. In the preceding chapters we have endeavored to give an outline of the ethical phase of Hegel's system, not with the intention of discovering how much there is to condemn, but how much we inherit from it that is true. In conclusion, a few words by way of summary may serve to bring together some of the main conclusions arrived at in the essay, which must be incomplete and, to that extent at least, imperfect. Philosophy for Hegel is an interpretation

²⁰ *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*: Introduction, p. xxxvii.

of life, of human experience. We speak of human progress, and we seek an explanation. For this explanation are we to look forward or backward? Hegel answers that every explanation of man must be of man as he now is. To trace every phase of human activity—society, morality and religion—back to its lowly beginnings, Hegel admits, will throw new light on what, at present, man is and does. This is true, indeed, of man above all other beings—only in the light of his history can he be adequately known. Man's life implies the natural and spiritual life of the race. Yet, if we are to speak of development in a sense other than that of mere aimless change, we must admit that what has been developed must in some way have been immanent in, indeed, the informing life of the process. "What Spirit is," says Hegel in one striking passage, "it has always been essentially; distinctions are only the development of this essential nature. The life of the ever-present Spirit is a circle of progressive embodiments, which looked at in one aspect still exist beside each other, and only as looked at from another point of view appears as past. The grades which Spirit seems to have left behind it, it still possesses in the depths of the present."

That the real is the intelligible and the intelligible the real, is the principle on which is based the idealism begun by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, revived by Kant, and which received its most adequate expression in Hegel. We endeavored to trace in outline through the history of philosophy the working of the metaphysical and ethical dualism which lingered in the systems of Plato and Aristotle, and gave rise to such abstractions as those of nature and spirit, necessity and freedom, the individual and society, the finite and the infinite. Hegel was the first clearly to perceive how these apparent disparates find their reconciliation in self-consciousness or in spirit. Man's fundamental characteristic—

his essence—for Hegel is self-consciousness. But man has no life alone. He is an intelligent and moral consciousness only as he goes outside of himself to find a kindred presence with the life of which he may identify himself. The finite consciousness, in knowledge and in its moral activity lives in its relationships. Indeed, there is but one self-consciousness which is the soul of all reality. Self-consciousness is God, who reveals Himself in nature and in the human spirit. All that is, is the revelation of spirit to itself. In the third chapter was considered in what sense it is permissible to speak of a development of the human self-consciousness. It was held that, instead of consciousness being the result of a physical process, rather the reverse was true; or, to use Green's words, "the constituent elements of an organism can only be truly and adequately conceived as rendered what they are by the end realized through the organism." The organism is instrumental, *i. e.*, organic to the life of self-conscious intelligence. Spirit is the truth of nature.

The individual is at first apparently immersed in nature. His end is self-realization; to become a free, self-conscious spirit is "the last of life for which the first was made." He is from the first a self-determining being. The will is the activity of consciousness as self-reflecting and self-objectifying. The life process is the realization of the "self" through environment. "Spirituality," says Prof. Royce, "lives by self-differentiation into mutually opposing forces, and by victory in and over these oppositions." To trace this realization of the "self" was the object of the remaining chapters. And Hegel teaches that self-realization can come only through self-renunciation. Not that for the realization of the moral life, the natural life is to be renounced, as with Kant. This natural life is rather to be transformed, spiritualized, and made the worthy setting for the higher life of the spirit. To be human, means to live a life of natural

wants, sympathies, and desires. Yet on these natural "appetites" of the merely individual self, there supervenes man's spiritual endowment—his essential self—reason, consciousness, the immanent life of which is that universal reason which has given rise to and still vitalizes and informs the spiritual environment in which the individual is to be realized. Self-consciousness is universal consciousness. "Spirituality is the community of spirits." For man to seek his good—the realization of himself—apart from the common good embodied in the life of the family, of the church and of the state, is to lose it. The individual good is the social good; the individual life, the social life. And, to conclude this essay with the closing words of Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, "That the history of the world, with all the changing scenes which its annals present, is this process of the development and actualization of Spirit—this is the true theodicy, the justification of God in history. Only *this* insight can reconcile the human spirit with the course of universal history—namely, that what has happened and is happening each day is not only not without God, but that it is essentially His work."

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VITA

I, JOHN ANGUS MACVANNEL, was born at St. Mary's, Ontario, October 5, 1871. I attended the St. Mary's Collegiate Institute for four years, matriculating into the University of Toronto, July 1889. In the University of Toronto I received honors in Classics, English Literature and Philosophy. My teachers in Philosophy were Prof. Baldwin, Prof. Hume, Dr. Tracy and Dr. Kirschmann. I received the B. A. degree in 1893, and the M. A. degree in 1894. During 1894-5, as Sage Scholar in Ethics in the Cornell University, I attended the lectures of President Schurman, Prof. Creighton, Prof. Titchener and Prof. Corson; and during 1895-6, as University Fellow in Philosophy in Columbia University, I attended the courses given by Prof. Butler, Prof. Hyslop, Dr. Farrand, and Prof. Giddings. My major subject was with Prof. Butler, to whose guidance and continued kindness I owe the completion of this dissertation.

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